

LETTERS
AND
NEGOCIATIONS
OF

M. *VAN HOEY*,
AMBASSADOR from the *States-General* to his Most Christian Majesty.

CONTAINING
An exact REPRESENTATION of the
present State of the Court of *France*, with
the CHARACTERS of the King and
his principal Ministers;

ALSO
Several curious Particulars relating to the LIFE
and MINISTRY of the late CARDINAL
DE FLEURY; with many Pieces of secret
but authentic History, in respect to the Com-
mencement and Continuance of the present
War, and the Intrigues that have been carried
on in order to prevent their HIGH MIGHTI-
NESSES from affording any EFFECTUAL
SUCCOURS to the Queen of *HUNGARY*:

TOGETHER WITH
Some memorable Anecdotes as to the past and present
Conduct of *GREAT BRITAIN*.

L O N D O N:
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P R E F A C E.

IF the sole business of a preface was to recommend the book to which it is prefixed to the favour of the reader, this would certainly need none. The reputation of M. *Van Hoey* is sufficient to excite the curiosity of the publick ; and the letters of a minister who has been fifteen years the favourite disciple of the late cardinal *de Fleury*, must deserve the notice of the world, while there is any taste for politics left. But my business, as an editor, is not to trouble such as peruse this work with what they will find in it, but
to

to account for some things which may be necessary to make it the better understood.

One may reasonably suppose that the first question that will be asked about these letters is, How they came to be printed? And the answer to that is not very easy. Whoever reads them will discern that they have occasioned a good deal of trouble both to the author and his masters, which might probably cause the making some copies of them for particular uses; and for the same reason we may suppose, that the rest of the pieces that are to be met with in this volume, were added to them by degrees, and when they became at last the object of an extraordinary resolution of the states general, this must necessarily create more and more discourse about them, and excite a more than ordinary desire of being acquainted with
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with their contents ; which it is very likely first multiplied manuscripts, and then it is no difficult matter to conceive how one of these should steal to the press.

This I am the rather inclined to think is a true account of the matter, from the order in which the letters stand ; wherein we have first a series of this ministers negotiations from his own pen, and then, by way of appendix, several dispatches, from cardinal *Fleury*, &c. and other papers necessary to support and explain them ; and lastly, the letters of M. *Van Hoey*, which apologize for his conduct, after he knew, by their solemn resolution, that his masters took it ill he should attempt to lead them by the nose.

If these had been digested into a chronological, which most people will be apt to call their natural order,

der, they might have appeared more methodical, but would have been really less intelligible ; and therefore it was, after mature deliberation, judged best to leave them as they are, and to help the chronology by a table.

These particulars will take away all doubts and difficulties, and put the reader in full possession of what we intended to give him. As to political reflections, it is impossible to make any, which would not offend some party amongst us, and thereby defeat the great end of this publication, which was to oblige all. We will therefore submit them without farther introduction to the candid perusal of *British* politicians, with this single observation, that if ever ministers are seen without disguise, it must be in their letters.

Chrono-



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LETTERS



LETTERS

FROM

M. *VAN HOEY*,

AMBASSADOR from the *States-General* to the *French Court*.

To M. Secretary *FAGEL*.

S I R,

I WAS at *Versailles* on *Tuesday* last, where I had the honour to see Monsieur the Cardinal and M. *Amelot*, and, from the conversation I had with these ministers, I am more and more satisfied as to what I have had the honour to inform you often, that this court is in the most perfect disposition to contribute by all means possible to satisfy the republic, and to increase and strengthen the friendship between the two nations.

The long delay of the news as to the success of the *English* before *Carthegena*, is the reason that the world flatters itself here more

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and more with the hopes that this city will be able to hold out against their utmost efforts; the court, however, is still under the same terrors and continual apprehensions as to dangerous consequences from the *English* attempts on the *Spanish West-Indies*.

It appears to me, that as it is here understood to be the principal object of the *English* policy at present to succeed in this enterprize, so all the thoughts of the *French* court tend solely to defeat it; and as with this view they would endeavour by some diversion on this side to put it out of the power of *England* to carry it into execution, the *English* on the other hand aim at hindering *France* from being able to make thereto any considerable opposition.

The thing being so, and that too visibly to leave any doubt after so many evident marks of the intentions of both courts, it follows, that we cannot too assiduously labour to bring about a pacification between *Spain* and *England*, that work being become indispensable, if we would succeed in any scheme for re-establishing the peace of *Europe*.

They have discoursed me again, as they do frequently, on the motives touched on in several of my former; and particularly that of the 9th of this month, by which they are here led to judge that their high mightinesses should undertake this great and important work, and prosecute it with all possible zeal.

I never fail to put them in mind of the insults offered by the *Spaniards* to vessels belonging to the subjects of the republic, and the just complaints we have a right to make against *Spain*.

The answer that I receive to this is, that they are far from justifying the *Spanish* government, since it shews no greater respect towards the *French* nation. That we ought to consider that this is but a slight evil, and which may be easily repaired; whereas, in case the *English* should carry their point, and become masters of the *Spanish America*, or even of its commerce, they will absolutely cut the nerves and arteries of this nation, and of ours too.

They add, that we shall necessary find a solid reparation of our grievances from the success of the laudable endeavours of their high mightinesses in this work of pacification, and that by the same means they will be prevented for the future; and that at all events their high mightinesses may labour this with the greater security, since on the one hand there is honour to be acquired, and no risk run on the other.

They likewise take notice of the vigilance which their high mightinesses expressed heretofore in the last general war, and at the peace of *Utrecht*; and their watchfulness to prevent the *English* from attempting any thing on the *Spanish America*; as also the

jealousy which the republic shewed as to the advantages which they would have stipulated for their commerce in those parts. So that, when the court of *France* compares this policy with the indifference shewn at present by their high mightinesses, when the *Spanish Indies* are in the utmost and most manifest danger of being totally subdued by the *English*, they infer from thence, that the court of *London* has found the way to divert the attention of their high mightinesses, by exhibiting to them the pictures of other dangers in a strong light, or by flattering them with the hopes of sharing these conquests, or, in fine, by amusing them with specious promises of their having only moderate views.

To this the court of *France* thinks it ought to oppose nothing more than its endeavours to dissipate by all means that chimera of ambitious designs, which they would attribute to this crown, by means of which *England* never ceases her endeavours to terrify the republic; and this they here wish the rather to succeed in, that the useless dissipation of the strength of the republic, the heightening distrusts between the two nations, and in fine the breach of the band of amity between them (all necessary and fatal consequences of these ill-grounded suspicions) can be avoided no other way. For as to the two other methods before-mentioned, by which *Eng-*
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land would interest the republic in her *American* expeditions, they cannot figure to themselves here, that the republic would enter, if I may so speak, into a partnership with the lion, and hunt with him ; nor that it is possible to imagine any means by which the general commerce of those *Indies*, as well in respect to the states as all other nations, can be secured, other than by putting an end to this war between *Spain* and *England*, on such terms as that on the one hand the illicit commerce may be restrained as much as possible, and on the other, such nations as are interested in that part of the world, may freely navigate their vessels to their own colonies.

They are farther clearly of opinion here, that the putting of all nations on an equality in this commerce, is the sole means by which they can be secured in the free enjoyment of it, since this equality will be the fruit of the natural and necessary guaranty of one nation for the other, the cause of one will become the cause of the other, and consequently the common cause of all ; whereas, the desire of having advantage over other nations, must necessarily produce a rupture of this natural guaranty, as well as many other effects prejudicial to all.

I cannot forbear adding what the cardinal told me in our last conversation, “ The *English*, said he, are in the wrong to think
“ me

“ me their enemy. It depends only upon
 “ them to have convincing proofs of the
 “ contrary. Let them put themselves but
 “ for a moment in our place, and let
 “ them act towards us as they might justly
 “ expect we should act towards them on a
 “ like occasion.” I am,

Paris, June
 23. 1741.

Sir, yours, &c,

LETTER from M. *Van Hoey*
 to M. *Fagel*.

S I R,

I HAD the honour last *Tuesday* to see the
 Cardinal and M. *Amelot* at *Versailles*. I
 was afterwards at M. *Amelot*'s, and opened
 the conversation with that minister, by say-
 ing, that the states-general persisted in their
 constant desire of cultivating the most perfect
 friendship with this crown. But his excel-
 lency answered me, “ What weight would
 “ you have us lay upon these verbal assuran-
 “ ces when they are falsified by facts? Is
 “ there not a member of the very states
 “ themselves, who, after having gained him-
 “ self much credit among the people, and
 “ captivated their affections, endeavours by
 “ his writings to raise the mob in order to
 “ force the states into a war? and what
 “ other thing, but the certain hopes of suc-
 “ cess,

“ cefs, continued this minifter, could induce that writer to flatter himfelf with impunity after fuch an attempt? ” My answer confifted partly in giving him to underftand, that thefe writings were mere flights of fancy and poetic-fictions, which in all ages had met with fuch indulgence, that it was become a proverb, *all things are lawful to painters and to poets*; and partly in that I infinuated my being thoroughly fatisfied, that he was too juft to ground on the words of any one member, how rash foever they might appear, a judgment difadvantageous to the fincerity of a whole ftate.

Upon this M. *Amelot* read the tranflation of two pieces in verfe, one after the other, adding, that it was to no purpofe to juftify an author who difcovered his pernicious defigns fo clearly.

As to the fecond part of my answer, his excellency faid the fame thing to me that the cardinal had done the *Friday* before, *viz.* that undoubtedly the republic would preferve its liberty as long as it fhould be fenfible that its moft natural and moft important intereft confifts in preferving a constant friendship with this crown. But that the period of its fall feemed to draw nigh, when with impunity people contrived to throw all into confufion, this impunity proving how little authority the government had, and how far the con-

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nivance of some, and the timidity of others extended.

I did not fail making use of all that could be said on the subject, in order to dissipate the sinister ideas of that minister: But he replied, that I did well to talk at this rate; but as for him, he considered the republic as in greater danger from the disposition of peoples minds at present, than she had ever been in heretofore. However he is always safe that God keeps. For his part he wished all might turn to the republic's utmost advantage.

After this, I had the honour to see the cardinal, who seemed to me extremely moved at the two poems; he said that the rank which the author held in the government, must necessarily give credit to the atrocious calumny of corruption with which he endeavoured to stigmatize in his verses so many worthy and illustrious persons in the regency of the republic.

The tender heart of the cardinal, which inclines him always to wish well to the republic, and to do justice to the wisdom of its government, furnished me with the means of quieting him, and was the cause that with respect to the preservation of the peace of the republic, I found the less trouble in bringing him back to that state of mind in which I found him last *Sunday*.

In our conversation his eminency observed, that in a state the consequences of a chimerical danger were not less to be feared, than those of an imaginary malady in the body, which by degrees is weakned, and even entirely destroyed by the use of a multitude of remedies.

As I recollected that the enemies of the state had given advice as if this court, contrary to good faith, designed to form, in the beginning of next spring, a formidable camp on the frontiers of the *Austrian Netherlands*, and another under the cannon of *Liege*, I ask'd the cardinal what there was in this story; his excellency answer'd, that it was a lye of the same stamp with so many thousand others that had been invented from the beginning, with an intent to deceive the state, and to induce it to take false measures. The conclusion of this discourse was, that he who loves danger, generally perishes by it; but such he said was the affection of *France*, that at least if the republic did not render the thing altogether impossible, this crown would never fail, on every occasion, to make it manifest by facts, how much she interests herself in the preservation and prosperity of the republic.

I saw the same day all the other ministers of state, who in respect to those poems talk'd to me in the same strain as the cardinal and M. *Amelot*.

A paper added to this dispatch.

“ A deputy from the province of *Friesland* to the states-general, a young man
 “ lively, witty, learned, and a good patriot,
 “ has lately published two pieces in verse,
 “ which make a great noise. The one
 “ consists of 16 stanza’s of four verses each:
 “ it is an application of several odes of
 “ *Horace* to the present situation of the
 “ republic, who in this poem is made to
 “ speak. The other piece consists of about
 “ an hundred elegiac verses : it is an allegory
 “ founded on the history of *Leonidas* the
 “ generous defender of *Sparta* and of *Greece*,
 “ and the entry of *Xerxes* through the
 “ streights of *Thermopilæ*, after the *Persian*
 “ monarch had found means to sow dis-
 “ cord among the *Greeks*. The whole is
 “ applied by the author to the present times
 “ in order to influence the people to the
 “ augmentation of troops, and the entering
 “ into a war.”

I am,

Paris, Feb. 16,
 1742.

Sir, yours, &c.

M.

M. *Van Hoey* to M. *Fagel*.

S I R,

ON *Thursday* last I saw M. *Amelot*, and his excellency informed me, according to the last advices he received, the fermentation of spirit in our republic was still increasing, insomuch that it was publicly asserted in the *United Provinces*, that it was necessary to make a third augmentation of troops, and at the same time to create a stadtholder in order to be safe from *France* and *Prussia*. The consequence this minister would draw from thence, was, that this evil could never be remedied till we resolve to tear up its cause by the roots: that to take such precautions would render it evident that the states distrust *France*, notwithstanding all the assurances she had given in order to draw the band of friendship the closer, which appeared to her the surest methods for curing that inquietude which ought to be irradiated from the body of the state as a mortal cancer: that there was nothing more certain than that this alarm so generally spread, flowed from the artificial insinuations of the enemies of the republic: that it did not appear at all impossible to him, that the same enemies might mislead the state into total destruction: that it was equally certain that the immutable and con-

stant maxims of the *English* were, I. To lessen the navigation and commerce of the state, and to weaken its naval force. II. To keep up a misunderstanding between the states and the crown of *France*, in order to keep the republic dependant on them, and to give her law. To which, continued he, we may add two other considerations, viz. that the *English* endeavour to involve the republic in a war with this crown from their jealousy of seeing its commerce flourish by the continuance of peace, while theirs is destroyed by a war; and they reckon to be able, by means of the republic, to give *France* so much trouble on that side, as that it shall not be in her power to oppose their design, to make themselves masters of the *Spanish West-Indies*.

By this one plainly sees the opinion they have here of the credit *England* hath with the republic, which may possibly engage the crown of *France* to put itself into a condition to have nothing to fear from the bad designs of the *English*, who endeavour to excite the republic to take up arms against *France*.

I have said all I could to disabuse M. *Amelot*, but to no purpose; and from that day to this *Wednesday* evening I have not been able to speak with the cardinal, who hath shut himself up in his apartment and sees nobody, so that it is very uncertain whether I shall be able to discourse with him before the departure

departure of the post. For this reason therefore, I have given his eminency to understand, by a billet, that I have indirect advice that the state is very well inclined to enter into a negotiation on the terms they had formerly proposed to him ; and that I besought his eminency to give me some light as to certain points, which I therein mentioned.

I have observed, that all the advices that come from the *United Provinces* agree with the notions of M. *Amelot*, and that we may attribute all this to certain poetry, as well as to frights about religion, which seem to have penetrated the hearts of our preachers. But this is no more than pure hypocrisy. We ought upon this occasion, to call to mind how, in the times of queen *Elizabeth* and the earl of *Leicester*, *England* gave law to the republic, and knew how to hold her in dependance ; and how easy it was for that crown, after the death of *Charles II.* king of *Spain*, to ally herself with the republic for dethroning *Philip V.* although she had solemnly acknowledged him just before : so that at this day it will not be more difficult for the *English* to engage the republic to make such efforts as are beyond her strength, and which consequently can have no other tendency than to destroy her. You will easily judge, Sir, that there is nothing more certain than, as the enemies of the republic have succeeded in sowing jealousies there of
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the crown of *France*, they may also succeed in giving ill impressions to this court, and creating in her a reciprocal distrust of the republic, on account of the great augmentation she hath lately made.

It is true that the consequences of so great a fermentation are very pernicious, but it will not be impossible to remedy them, especially if their high mightinesses have really an intention to preserve peace and friendship with this crown, and to agree upon such means as she may judge most capable of strengthening this good intelligence.

I had proceeded thus far, Sir, when I received the cardinal's answer to my billet, which I have the honour to annex to this letter, that you may see in how gracious a manner his eminency gives me leave to come to him at *Iffi*, which I did this *Thursday* morning.

In our conversation, the cardinal did no more than assure me by word of mouth of what is contained in the forementioned letter, in the strongest terms, and after a manner which demonstrates the sincerity of his sentiments, as to the interest of the republic; he told me, however, that the republic had indeed strong reasons to cultivate a friendship with the crown of *England*, but that she ought not to be wholly at her devotion, since, from reasons and maxims perpetual in their nature, her inter-
ests

rests were in eternal opposition to those of the state ; since the *English* could not suffer any rival in commerce, which was however (if the expression might be allowed) the very soul of the republic.

His eminency farther observed to me, how in the last war the *English* had succeeded in almost entirely ruining the naval force of the republic, which is the sole support of its commerce : that at present, she could not doubt, that the keeping up 80,000 men would reduce her into a much worse state, than she was in those days, and that consequently the *English* to carry their point, would leave no stone unturned to draw the republic into those mischiefs, which his eminency had set forth to me.

I find to my great satisfaction that the cardinal continues to render the utmost justice, to the wise and prudent conduct of their high mightinesses, in preserving the public tranquillity, and that the accounts which come from all sides of the imminent danger it is in of being disturbed, make but very little impression on the mind of his eminency.

I apprehend that the contents of this dispatch, are of importance enough to quiet the minds of our countrymen, and to strengthen the good intelligence between the republic and this court. For this reason,

son, I have sent it by a courier whom I desire you to pay.

Letters from *Prague*, of the 11th of this month say, that the allies have put a garrison into *Iglaw*, which the *Austrians* had evacuated. The king of *Prussia* has changed his plan of attacking the troops of the queen of *Hungary* at *Budweis* and *Tabor*, because they are there too strongly posted, and his *Prussian* majesty now designs to march into *Moravia*.

Paris, Feb.
23, 1741.

I am yours, &c.

M. Van Hoey to M. Fagel.

S I R,

ON *Tuesday* last, I saw M. *Amelot* here, the king being not that day at *Versailles*; and tho' his excellency did not tell me directly, that the court of *France* had a copy or at least an extract of the resolution of their high mightinesses of the 19th of last month, in answer to the propositions made by lord *Stair*, I could however easily perceive that the thing was so.

It appears to me on this occasion then, that nothing is more desired here, than to promote whatever may strengthen and secure the friendship between the two nations:

tions: it had been and would still be very agreeable, if their high mightinesses should think it fit to take away all distrust, by shutting the door to the propositions made by the *English* for drawing the republic into a war with this crown. For as it is well known here, how great an interest *England* has in carrying this point in order to facilitate her other views, they are persuaded, she will put herself, (if I may be allowed the expression) into a thousand different postures and figures, and neglect nothing in order at last to seduce the republic, and induce it to give in to her notions.

You know, Sir, that at this place they apprehend that a misunderstanding between the republic and this court is the properest means for *England* to come at her point, and that it is therefore impossible to be too careful on the one side, or on the other, to avoid whatever may conduce thereto.

In the mean time, the resolution of their high mightinesses, is looked upon here both by the publick and by the foreign ministers, as a flat negative; for this reason, people think they cannot sufficiently commend the wisdom of their high mightinesses, in the midst of so many temptations, or bestow on them the praises they deserve for having so steadily embraced peace, that most valuable blessing, and that they continue to let their subjects reap the agreeable

fruits thereof, while almost all *Europe* is ravaged and ruined by armies, and the rest of it feels the scourge of war tho' less severely.

A person of distinction, of great good sense, and who has an extraordinary kindness for the republic, of whose sentiments I have more than once thought proper to give an account to their high mightinesses, spoke to me some days ago as to the forementioned resolution, and told me, that he firmly believed that it was to no purpose the attempting to engage the republic in a war for the support of the ballance, because the ballance with respect to the republic, thro' the present situation of affairs, is mounted to its highest period, at least, humanly speaking; for the two neighbouring powers, most capable of giving umbrage to the state, *viz. France* and *Prussia*, have an equal interest in hindering the growth of each others force. Besides, they would least of all permit this at the expence of a state, which serves as a common barrier between them both; from whence he concluded, that the republic ought to lay the greatest stress on the friendship of two powers, whose interest obliged them to live in perfect harmony with her. To which he added farther, that a good intelligence between *France* and the republic, was the sole counterpoise that could preserve the ballance of free navigation and of commerce. But, answered I, what shall the
republic

republic do in case *France* and *Prussia* should agree to render themselves our masters?

He answered me, *first*, by asking me another question, what, said he, would the republick do if *France* and the house of *Austria* should form such a design? *Secondly*, He endeavoured to make me comprehend how impossible it was that ever such a thing should come about, on account of the difference of the religions profest by the kings of *France* and *Prussia*; for both potentates professing a zeal for the extention of their respective faiths, this alone is sufficient to hinder them from entering into any close engagements, and especially from concerting together such unnatural and pernicious enterprises.

M. *Amelot* told me further, that the same evening the action happened at *Frauenberg*, the *Austrians* were beaten out of the village of *Sabai*, and that they had retired into a wood in the neighbourhood, which put an end to the battle, and that from thence they immediately took the road to *Budweis*.

He likewise told me, that M. *Broglia* had made himself master the next morning of a little town called *Tein*, in which there was an *Austrian* garrison.

The marshal's army is at present encamped on this side the river, and on the other side of *Tein*.

The *Austrian* army, under the command of prince *Charles* of *Lorrain*, is posted at *Naber*, near *Duisenbrood*, where it is said he has received a reinforcement of two regiments of cavalry, and two regiments of foot.

The duke *d'Harcourt*, who is actually with his troops near *Deckendorff*, has received a considerable reinforcement, insomuch that he is now far superior to count *Kevenhuller*.

Marshal *Bellisle* set out two days after the battle of *Frauenberg* to confer with the king of *Prussia*, and, as soon as he shall return to the army on the *Moldaw*, M. *Broglie* will set out to take upon him that in *Bavaria*.

Paris, June
23. 1741.

I am yours, &c.

M. *Van Hoey* to M. *Fagel*.

S I R,

I WAS the day before yesterday at *Iffy* to see the cardinal, and I had the satisfaction to find his eminence not only perfectly recovered of his great cold, but also in as good health as ever.

The cardinal spoke to me again of the resolution of their high mightinesses of the 19th of last month, in answer to the *English* ambassador, and testified to me his satisfaction thereupon.

His

His eminency conceived of himself the reasons which determined their high mightinesses not to communicate it to this court, being a private answer to certain propositions made to the states by another power, which might possibly have thought itself insulted in case they divulged their intentions; and according to their prudent and sublime wisdom, it can never be thought expedient, in order to please one court, to draw off another (if I may so speak) upon her back.

The cardinal told me further, that it was the true interest of *England*, in order to carry its particular point, to the prejudice of all other trading nations, to keep the war on foot, whereas it was that of the republic to put an end to it. Whence he concluded, that these two considerations, without entering into others, ought to be regarded as two powerful motives to induce their high mightinesses to shut, once for all, and for ever, the door against all propositions and insinuations tending to draw the republic into a war against this crown: and that this would be the only means to take away all hope from *England*, as also to discredit all the reasons she makes use of to engage the queen of *Hungary* to brave the utmost extremities rather than consent to a peace, agreeable to the present situation of her affairs; tho', humanly speaking, it is most evident that time must

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must by degrees render the circumstances of that queen worse and worse.

I laid hold of this opportunity to inform myself further from the cardinal, whether there was any body here *incognito* with letters of credence to negotiate on the part of that princess. To this he answered in such a manner, as gave me reason to apprehend that the report spread to that purpose was entirely destitute of foundation ; but that certainly the queen of *Hungary* would not take any ineffectual step in case she address'd herself to this court, since nothing is so much wished here as the bringing about a salutary peace.

Having learned from some of the foreign ministers residing here (for I tell you in confidence that I hold no correspondence direct nor indirect, with the members of the republic) that it had been whispered in the *United Provinces*, that marshal *Bellisfe* had declared at *Francfort*, that *France* would never consent to a peace, at least 'till the fortifications of *Luxembourg* were first razed, I thought it my duty to engage the cardinal to explain himself upon this head, who answered, that this report was absolutely false, since the court had never given the marshal orders to make any such declarations ; adding, after a moment's reflection, " if they look upon demolishing these fortifications as a thing that concerns the interest
" of

“ of the republic, why does she not take the
 “ precautions necessary to parry the blow?
 “ Is it not in the power of their high mighti-
 “ nesses to prevent this, by accepting the of-
 “ fers we have so often made them.”

The last letters from *Bavaria* say, that the duke *d'Harcourt*, who is with his army in the neighbourhood of *Schollenach*, had attempted to surprize the castle of *Hilkersberg*, but had been obliged to abandon his enterprize with the loss of two or three hundred men kill'd or wounded, and that the field-marshal *Toring* was arrived there.

The army of Count *Kevenbulla* is encamped at *Inghelshoven*, a small distance from the forementioned castle, where he has a bridge over the *Danube*.

We have also advice, by the way of *Venice*, of the deposition of the grand vizier, and that his predecessor *Ali* bashaw had been thereupon honoured with that dignity.

The journey of cardinal *Tencin* to his archbishoprick of *Lyons* is fixed to the 17th of this month.

I am

Paris, June
 11, 1742.

Yours, &c.

M.

M. *Van Hoey* to M. *Fagel*.

S I R,

WE have advice here of the embarking a second transport of *British* troops at *Ostend*, and that the *English* quicken their preparations for sending still more.

You know, Sir, that at first we were of opinion here, that this was done in concert with the republic, but as the resolution of the 19th of last month has effaced that suspicion, it was believed this embarkation would not have taken place.

It is apprehended, that the reasons that induced the *English* to persist in their designs were,

I. In order to hinder the queen of *Hungary* from making peace, by giving her some real assistance, in hopes of engaging the republic at last, because the safety and interest of the *English* demand that the war should still be kept on foot.

II. To have by means of the war, in which they would involve the republic, an opportunity of hindering her from extending her commerce, an object which has been always the *Alpha* and *Omega* of their policy.

III.

III. In case they should not be able, by this embarkation, to engage the republic in a war, they may at the worst make it a pretence for laying hold of *Ostend* by way of a pledge.

IV. In fine, because labouring to bring about a general war against *France*, is the best way of making court to the whole *English* nation. For according to their notions this is magnanimity and the very height of heroism, with which the new ministry have set out, and by talking loud of the before-mentioned advantages, they easily gain the hearts of the people, who pay their taxes with the greatest chearfulness.

Letters from the imperial army near *Wintzer* of the third, inform us, that count *Kevenbulla* passed the *Danube* near *Hilkerberg*, with all his foot, and made the necessary preparations for attacking the enemy, but that he had on a sudden repassed the river again, to the great surprize of his own troops.

We have no news of the king of *Prussia's* army, nor that of marshal *Broglie*.

Letters from *Toulon* of the 4th of this month say, that the day before an *English* frigate had taken in that road, and under the cannon of the forts, a *Spanish* vessel laden with provisions. This does not appear very extraordinary here, where it is very

F

well

well understood, that the *English* aim at nothing so much as forcing the *French* to declare war against them, in hopes thereby to gain the assistance of the republic.

The report is loud that upon *Spain's* demanding from *France*, in the strongest and most precise terms, a body of troops to join those she has sent in *Provence* and *Languedoc*, it has been agreed to grant her 14 batallions; but I don't pretend to answer for the truth of this.

Its believed that this demand is founded on the powerful assistance that *France* has given to the emperor in order to support his pretensions; whence it is concluded, that she would not refuse so small a thing to so near a relation. Besides, it is apprehended that the reasons which have influenced *France* in taking this step, are the continual apprehensions she is under that *Spain* should make a peace with *England* to her prejudice, and to that of trade in general.

I am, &c.

Paris, 18 June,
1742.

Memoir

Memoir of what was contained in a relation of M. Van Hoey's, dated Nov. 5, 1742.

WE have certain advices from the *Hague*, that lord *Carteret* has mis-carried in all the points of his negotiation with their high mightinesses.

They are reduced to four propositions :

1. To engage the republic to join with *England* and her allies in making war with *France*.
2. To put garrisons in all the strong places in *Flanders* belonging to the queen of *Hungary*, that she may be able to withdraw her troops, and employ them in the field.
3. To lend 30,000 men of the troops of the republic to the queen of *Hungary*, which troops are to be in the pay of *Great Britain*.
4. A new treaty of commerce between *England* and the republic, to the advantage of the states.

To the first proposition the states-general answer'd, That the war having now spread itself all over *Europe*, they would not inter-meddle therewith to lengthen it, and render it more bloody, but would preserve their

characters as mediators for the common good.

As to the second, That the republic never keep troops on foot but for her just defence, and for the maintenance of the general tranquility.

To the third, That the republic, since she was a republic, had never made a custom of lending or letting out her troops to foreign powers, but on the contrary had taken troops into her own pay when occasion required it.

As to the fourth, that their high mightinesses would be very glad to receive so sensible a mark of the friendship of *England*, as this would be, of establishing the commerce of both nations on a more equal foot, and consequently less prejudicial to *Holland*: that besides she sincerely wished to knit faster the reciprocal band of amity between the two nations, by all just and proper methods: but that it was the inviolable maxim of the republic, not to make herself happy, but by making others happy: that she could not think of bettering her situation on condition to promote the war, and at the expence of the publick welfare of *Europe*.

M. Van Hoey to the States-General.

High and mighty lords,

I AM informed by the envoy of *Poland*, that what has been reported for some time past of a body of *Saxons* entering into the service of *England*, is without the least foundation ; and he told me, that there was not the smallest reason to imagine, that if any such negotiation had been set on foot, it could be so suddenly hurried to a conclusion.

A new and very great augmentation of troops which the king of *Prussia* has resolved on, in order to support some old pretensions, makes still one of the principal points on which all conversation turns at present.

A man of sense, a friend to the republic, and whose sentiments for that reason I often take the liberty to communicate to your high mightinesses, conversing with me upon this subject, remark'd, that ambition and a desire of augmenting its dominions, were always inseparable from a great power, and that the republic had experienced this truth many times, and from different quarters.

That vigilance, prudence, justice, and the love of peace, steadily pursued by the republic, were very efficacious means for preventing the bad consequences of this evil,
but

but that the power of one of their neighbours was also a very great security against any abuse of great power intended by another; so that the interest of the republic, far from lying in assisting one to crush the other, was in fact and in truth plac'd in the preservation of all.

From hence he drew this conclusion, That it was a thing absolutely contrary to the good of the state, to see *France* and the house of *Austria* exhausting each other excessively by the present war; and that this was one strong reason why the state should undertake with zeal and affection a work so salutary for all nations in general, and so glorious for ours in particular, as that of bringing about a pacification in *Europe* would be.

This worthy man finished his discourse by telling me, that his policy was not of a piece with that of the astrologer, who while he pretended to discover future events by gazing at the stars, saw so little what was at his foot as to fall into a pit: that he did not believe it was true wisdom to sacrifice a real good, as peace is, to the chimerical fear of certain dangers which we think we see afar off; but preserving so precious a blessing for the present, we ought to be as careful as possible to secure its duration by our wise and prudent conduct.

A person who is able to speak of these things, from perfect knowledge of their causes, informed me, that a certain pretended zealot had thrown the city of *Geneva* into a prodigious fright, by sending three dispatches on the heels of each other, with a view to persuade the inhabitants, that there was a design formed here to put that city into the hands of the king of *Sardinia*, in order, by so doing, to engage him to change his side, but at last the people were pacified by offering two or three reflections to their consideration.

In the first place they were shewed, by little and little, that the execution of such a design was absolutely impossible, as well on account of the proper forces of the republick, as from the quick and efficacious succours they might receive from the *Swiss cantons*.

They were next shewn how improbable a thing it was that this crown, which always made it so much a point to preserve the republick of *Geneva*, of which, on many occasions, and some very late ones, it had given the most shining proofs, that this crown, said he, should in the present conjuncture conspire its ruin, and thereby draw upon itself so many new enemies. Letters from *Dauphine* say, that the *Spanish* generals have at last taken a resolution to put their soldiers into hutts, after having lost at least a fourth

fourth part of their army in the space of five or six weeks by mortality and desertion.

By a courier from marshal *Broglie*, who left the army on the third, we are informed, that he had caused bread to be distributed for six days to all his troops with an intent to march directly to join count *Seckendorf*, and with their united forces to attack those of the queen of *Hungary*. It is said at court, that it is mere necessity that hath obliged him to take this step; the marshal seeing himself reduced to hazard a battle, in hopes of victory, or to behold the utter destruction of his army by a thousand miseries.

The cardinal grows better and better every day, as you'll perceive by the inclos'd note from his first valet de chamber. His eminency confers with none but the ministers of state, during the space he has taken to repose himself, and has laid aside absolutely all thoughts of other affairs.

I am

Paris, Decemb.
10, 1742.

Yours, &c.

BILLET *from the first Valet de Chambre
of his Eminency to M. Van Ho y, dated
from Issy.*

My Lord,

Decemb. 9, 1742.

HIS eminency is considerably better,
he sleeps well, has a good appetite,
has had nothing of his looseness for three
days, and said mass yesterday, so that things
are in a good way. His eminency is very
sensible of your excellency's enquiries, thanks
you heartily, and counts upon your friend-
ship.

Yours, &c.

BAR JAC.

M. Van Hoey to M. Fagel.

S I R,

ON *Monday* I had the honour to see the
cardinal at *Issy*, I found him much
better than when I left him on *Saturday*
sevenight. *M. Telluson* minister here from
the repulic of *Geneva*, informs me that this
court was by no means satisfied with the go-
vernment of *Geneva's* giving so ready belief
to the false advice of a pretended patriot, of
which I have given an account in my most
humble letter of the 10th instant, and he
desired me that I would employ my interest
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with the cardinal to soften to him as much as possible, as to what passed upon that occasion; for you must know, Sir, that these false reports made such an impression at *Geneva*, that the government thought proper to regulate with the cantons of *Zurich* and *Berne*, the signals that they are accustomed to make in times of the greatest danger.

To comply with his request, I began the conversation with the cardinal, by representing to him to how great a length, that love which all men naturally have for the preservation of their liberty and religion will carry them; and that therefore we ought not to blame the precautions they take for securing such precious treasures, whenever they believe them in danger. I next made an application of this general maxim, to the conduct of the republick of *Geneva*. His eminency acknowledged, that I had reason on my side, as to what I advanced in my thesis; but so far as it related to the republick of *Geneva*, their proceedings resembled rather suspicions unjustly conceived, and consequently very injurious to this crown, than to wise precautions dictated by prudence. His eminency then spoke to me of the misfortunes that generally overwhelm those, who endeavour only to satisfy their ambition, by inciting domestick troubles, or kindling foreign wars as often as with any appearance of truth,

truth, they can suggest that liberty or religion is in danger; that histories are full of examples which prove that not only hypocrites and *Tartuffs*, but also such as have said in their hearts, there is no God, have frequently succeeded in deluding the people by this means, and have been their victims in the end.

I made use of this reflection of the cardinal's, to make him sensible that there could not be a better reason for excusing the *Genevese*, who had only been too credulous in a case, in which of all others human nature is most apt to take umbrage, and this I had the good luck to push so effectually, and to make his eminency enter so far into my sentiments, that I flatter myself, he has not so much as the shadow of resentment against the people of *Geneva*.

In the same conversation, as also in that which I had the day following, with the other ministers at *Versailles*, it appeared to me clearly :

- I. That the courts of *London* and *Vienna*, continue still to practice upon the emperor, by the most seducing offers of their friendship, and to assure him that they will give him the most essential proofs of it by an augmentation of his dominions, provided he will de-

clare himself an enemy to this crown, and altho' this court has not the least reason in the world to suspect his imperial majesty will be drawn in by such pretences, to the prejudice of his honour and glory, it is however natural to suppose, that such flattering offers will necessarily produce the proposed effect, *viz.* hindering the emperor from justifying his arms by a formal declaration, declaring his resolution to obtain what actually belongs to him, and to render evident the great injustice of his enemies.

II. That the disposition of the court of *Versailles* to peace remain precisely the same, and that she still most passionately wishes that of *Europe* in general, and of this crown in particular, may be owing to their high mightinesses.

III. And *lastly*, That the new levies mentioned in my former are now fixed only at 300 troops of horse, consisting of 35 each; 48 troops of *Hussars*, and seven battallions to be joined to the seven *German* regiments which are at present in the service of the crown of *France*. But it is very possible they may speedily push these levies much further; because it is here thought, that the surest way of hastening the peace so long desired, is to put themselves into a posture proper

per to shew thee vanity of thir ambition who seek to satisfy themselves by a continuation of these troubles.

As the means by which the general peace may and ought to be established make at present here, as probably they do elsewhere, the principal topic of conversation, I cannot forbear adding upon that subject, what I have heard from persons whose judgments have the greater weight with me, because they have been almost always justified by the event, *viz.* that the motives the parties now engaged in war have to seek for peace, and their schemes for conducting that salutary work to a good end, may be reduced under these two heads, *1st*, That the shortest follies are the best; *2^{dly}*, That it is better to stop short in the middle of a bad road, than to persist in going on: this being settled, that every one should be content with his own, without troubling any farther others in the possession of theirs; and besides, shewing a proper disposition to make equitable reparations and satisfaction, as far as is in their power, to the end that matters may be settled between the emperor and the queen of *Hungary*, in the state in which they were before the war, and things between the courts of *England* and *Spain* may be put on a footing agreeable to the law of nations and the tenor of treaties; for then this great work would be very near the point of perfection, and in a
con-

condition of being as lasting as the incertainty of human affairs will permit, because the particular interest of each party, secured on conditions equal and just for all, would serve for the basis.

I have not since the beginning of these troubles (you can bear me witness, Sir) reasoned on any other principle than what is contained in these two maxims; and tho' this has made a great many people very angry with me, yet I could never perceive that such a conduct rendered me disagreeable to the ministers of this court, whether it proceeds from their opinion of my candor and sincerity, or that the brightness and beauty of truth made sufficiently my apology towards all who dare heartily rise up in her defence. I dare also take upon me to say, that at present this whole nation have so thoroughly adapted these two wise maxims as to make them the rules of their conduct, conformable to what I have hinted in many of my former relations.

I had hitherto forgot to insert the following words, which the cardinal let fall in the same conversation: " Self-love, pride, and
 " the councils of the *English* court, have
 " gained such an ascendant over the
 " spirit of the court of *Vienna*, that without
 " the least breach of charity, I think I may
 " safely declare to you, that all sentiments
 " of good faith, justice and equity, are there
 " abso-

" absolutely stifled and destroyed." In saying this, his eminency stopt short, and, as I am not accustomed to force a conversation by asking improper questions in order to draw out what was never intended to be told me, our conversation ended here.

Paris, Dec.
23, 1742.

I am yours, &c.

M. Van Hoey to M. Fagel.

S I R,

THE march of the troops which are in *Flanders* is at present the principal topic of public speculations, and was also that of my conversation last *Tuesday* with the cardinal and other ministers of this court; and as far as I am able to penetrate, the intelligence they have upon this subject amounts nearly to what follows, *viz.* that the duke *d'Aremberg*, being perfectly acquainted with the moderation of this court, which is content to procure a peace between the emperor and the queen of *Hungary*, upon terms with which their high mightinesses are acquainted, had induced the court of *England* to take a resolution with respect to this march, by making it apparent, that there being no longer any question about preserving to her *Hungarian* majesty all that belongs to her, there was no other way of pro-

protracting the war, than by making her hope that these conditions might be bettered by advantages that might be gained by her troops: but as these hopes are incompatable with her force, there would still remain no other step to take but peace, atleast if *England* should refuse, by the junction of her troops in *Flanders*, to put it in her power totally to ruin those of *France* in *Bavaria* and *Bohemia*.

That upon this representation of the duke *d'Arcemberg*, the king of *England* had consented to this last project, or rather to that of penetrating into the heart of *France* by *Lorraine* or *Champagne*, without laying down his arms, till the emperor was forced to abdicate in favour of the grand duke, and till the queen was put in possession of *Alsace* and *Lorraine*, or obtained some augmentation of her dominions equivalent thereto. That the queen of *Hungary* had on her side also engaged, that as soon as this should be effected, she would be content to leave the dutchies of *Parma* and *Placentia*, and perhaps something more, if it was necessary, to the disposition of *England*, to the end, that by yielding these dominions to Don *Philip*, she may obtain either settlements in the *Spanish West-Indies*, or such new advantages in trade, as the *British* court shall think proper to accept.

Tho'

Though they spoke pretty positively to me on this new project, yet at the same time they expressed their doubts as to its being effectually carried into execution, and the principal reasons they offer in support of these doubts, were what follow ;

I. The length of the march from *Flanders*, into *Bavaria* and *Bohemia*, the rigour of the season and the difficulty of finding provisions on the march, having no magazine any where.

II. The natural aversion which it must be supposed all *German* troops, such as *Hanoverians* and *Hessians*, have to oppose against the emperor their sovereign, as he is head of the empire, and to enter, for that end, into a country, which may be properly called the Lion's Den, where there are footsteps enough to be seen of those that are gone before, but few or none of such that have found their way back.

III. Because endeavouring to oblige the emperor to abdicate, is in effect, a declaring war against the whole empire ; so that the mischiefs necessarily resulting from so odious a project as that to the queen of *Hungary*, will much over-balance any kind of advantages she can propose to herself in taking this step.

IV. Because, supposing even the point to be carried in beating the *French* troops, and driving them out of *Bohemia* and *Bavaria*, still the conquest of *Alsace* and *Lorrain* will not be less difficult, or the success of it less uncertain ; not to add that this enterprize seems humanly speaking, too great for the forces of *England* and the queen of *Hungary* joined together.

V. Because, besides the obstacles they must meet with in the invasion of *Lorrain*, or *Champagne*, such an expedition would have the same fate with bombardments, which never turn out to their profit, in any shape, who undertake them, and who besides pay very dearly themselves for the mischiefs they do to others.

VI. And lastly, for the reasons which I have often mentioned in some of my former, the cession of certain settlements, or extraordinary advantages of commerce in the *Spanish America*, in the prejudice of other nations in general, and of this of ours in particular, far from being a good, would be in fact a disadvantage to *England*. I recollect in these conversations, that at the same time when *England* and the queen of *Hungary* was making great preparations for reducing the emperor, these

these two courts employed the most seducing offers in order to draw his imperial majesty to join his power to theirs to make war against *France*, and to cooperate in disposing the empire to elect the grand duke of *Tuscany*, king of the *Romans*, which rendered all the negotiations between this court and that of the emperor, infinitely more difficult and delicate than they had been before; for as men generally attach themselves to those from whom they hope the greatest advantages, there was nothing farther from impossible than that the emperor should suffer himself in the end to be brought over, and to prefer the friendship of *England* and *Hungary* to that of *France*, since these two crowns promise him a great addition to his dominions, whereas the latter would oblige him to be content with what is his own.

This reflection furnishes a new proof, and that the most convincing, of their being no other way than the pacific efforts of their high mightinesses capable to restore the general tranquillity, by explaining the real objects which the several parties in this quarrel have in view, distinguishing with certainty where ambition absolutely governs, and where true moderation reigns, so as at

last to force all, if I may so speak, into peace, by the sole power of truth.

The cardinal repeated to me what he had often said in former conversations, *viz.* That the wisdom of their high mightinesses shone particularly bright in their vigilant care to divert all dangers, from what quarter soever they arose; and in their assiduity, in cultivating, by all proper and lawful means, the friendship of their most potent neighbours; adding, that as peace was certainly most advantageous for *England*, and the queen of *Hungary* in particular, as well as the greatest blessing to all nations in general, it might possibly happen, that some tempers might be exasperated at these christian efforts of their high mightinesses, to procure so salutary an end; but that resentment in this case may be compared to that which a man conceives in a high fever against any one who endeavours to keep him quiet, which resentment very soon changes into thankfulness.

The cardinal goes on *Wednesday* afternoon from *Iffy* to *Versailles*, in order to confer in the evening with the king, and intends to go back the next day to his retreat, and to remain there at his ease, till after the commencement of the new year.

His eminency appeared to me, to be somewhat weaker than he was last week,
though

though still in pretty good spirits. The *Sieur Helvetius* who knows his constitution perfectly, spoke to me freely, and told me within these very few days, that the cardinal's habit was so strong, that he might still live a great many years, if he would only relax a little in his daily labours.

A letter has been communicated to me, written by a minister at the court of *Turin*, wherein, he says, that general *Traun* has lately possessed himself of *Bagni de Poretta*, which he has caused to be occupied by a detachment of 4000 foot. By means of this post, which is near the rise of the river *Reno*, he has cut off the communication of the *Spanish* general *M. de Gages* with *Lucca*, and the territories of the state of *Genoa*, and that they were thereby in a condition to prevent the *Spaniards* in case they attempted to execute any designs upon *Tuscany*; *M. Traun* having recalled the 3000 horse and *Hussars*, that had taken post within a league of *Bologna*.

We are assured that *M. de Glimes* has dispatched a courier to *Madrid*, to represent the impossibility of attacking the *Piedmontese* army, with the least appearance of success, as also the absolute necessity of putting his own troops into winter-quarters.

Paris, Dec. 27,
1742.

I am yours, &c.

M.

M. *Van Hoey* to M. *Fagel*.

S I R,

ON *Tuesday* and *Wednesday* I went to see the cardinal and others ministers according to custom, and I have learned that according to the informations of this court, it is but too true, that *England* labours with greater warmth, and even more hopes of success than ever to draw the state from her solid and salutary centre of repose, in order to throw her into the fire of war, which consumes all ; and that to effect this, they not only abuse the sacred founts of religion and liberty, but also make an ill use of the amiable name of peace itself. As if religion and reason left us the least doubt as to a truth, so generally acknowledged as that which teacheth us, that peace is the greatest of all blessings bestowed by heaven, and that war is the heaviest of all scourges ? as if trampling peace under foot and running to embrace that monster war, was the most salutary means for securing so great a good, and keeping off so terrible a scourge ; altho' nature it self has engraved in all hearts, this principle, that to be filled with a true love of peace, and to demonstrate this in all our actions, is the only way always to preserve it.

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The ministers observed also, that it was no less clear, that when once the fire of war was kindled, it would continue burning always with the utmost vehemence, in proportion to the republic's furnishing supplies of combustible matter ; whereas the pacific endeavours of their high mightinesses could not fail of putting it soon out, because by these each party loosing all hopes of satiating their vengeance, and gratifying its thirst of power at the expence of the blood and treasure of the republic, their minds must necessarily become calm. This too there is more reason to expect, since the calamities of war have been long enough felt, to make the true value of peace known and regretted.

I pass in silence several other reasons alledged by the ministers to inforce those which I have mentioned, because I have inserted them in many of my former. I shall mention only a passage taken, if I am not mistaken, from *Grotius*, which was cited to me not long ago, as applicable to that out-side shew of virtue by which men are accustomed to mask the most mischievous of their passions. It was this, " Let us hear those men discourse who preach up the necessity of war ; it is only according to their doctrine, the more effectually to secure our peace. But if they were really peaceably inclined they would never break it, because it depends only upon them to preserve it."

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The ministers likewise remarked, that *England*, among other motives she employed in order to engage the republic in a war, cryed up mightily the wisdom of the old system, which was to ballance the power of *France*, by the combined forces of the house of *Austria*, *England*, and the republic, and press the necessity of reviving this system at present. They took notice to me on this subject, that we need only consider with attention the strength and other advantages that *England* had gained by carrying this scheme of theirs into execution, and the decay so visible at present in the naval forces of the state, as also of its navigation and commerce, in comparison to what all these things were before the *English* found the secret of engaging the republic in their wars against *France*, and of making them consider this engagement as a maxim very salutary for her. If you consider, say these ministers, this point ever so little, you must be convinced, that to undertake another war in the same manner, must infallibly end no otherwise than by giving the *coup de grace* to the republic.

However, notwithstanding all these different assaults which *England* ceases not to make in order to conquer the pacific temper of such as administer the affairs of the republic, this court still flatters itself, that peace will prevail, and remain at last victorious. The reasons upon which they found this opinion

nion may, in my opinion, be reduced under the following heads:

- I. Because they cannot suppose the republic engaged by any treaties with the house of *Austria*, or with any other power to enable them to wreck their vengeance on this crown, and satisfy their lust of rule, because an engagement of this nature would be contrary to religion and humanity, and consequently to all that might be expected from a wise, prudent and moderate republic.
- II. Because their high mightinesses are perfectly well informed of the pacific disposition of this court; and that from the memorial of the baron *d'Reisbach* they may see, that the queen of *Hungary* has not thought fit to listen to the kind propositions made to her, tho' the honour and interest of her archducal house were so fully taken care of by them: whence it follows, that their high mightinesses, entering into a war, cannot be by virtue of treaties which subsist between their high mightinesses and the house of *Austria*, those alliances being only defensive.
- III. Because peace has been always considered by their high mightinesses as the very soul of the state, and the preservation of it as the most important of their

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cares ;

cares; so that there is not any appearances that their high mightinesses should take up arms in any other case than that of the defence of themselves, or their allies, which would justify their having a recourse to so afflicting and troublesome an extremity.

IV. That the infinite difference between establishing the repose of *Europe* by the sole wisdom of the state, the glory which will accrue to the republick, the love, the gratitude, the veneration, with which the bringing about such a peace must inspire all nations, for the authors of so good an action, contributing so much to the strengthening of their present government; and between fomenting and nourishing with the blood and wealth of their subjects, so cruel a war as must necessarily dissipate their revenues, and absolutely ruin their forces, leaves me no room to doubt that the state can hesitate a single moment which to chuse of these extremities.

V. That to aid, directly or indirectly, those that attack this crown, under the name of auxiliaries, or in any other manner whatsoever, would be so absolutely contrary to the treaties which subsist between *France* and the republick, and to the many warm assurances lately given by their high mightinesses
nay

may even so recently, as by their resolution of the 28th of *March* last, of their constant attachment to the friendship of this crown; and that in fact they will endeavour to shew the sincerity of these assurances in all their proceedings, without suffering themselves to be diverted therefrom by any propositions or insinuations whatever; in fine, so contrary to the many proofs of friendship which *France* has given to this republick within these thirty years the peace has subsisted, as also the just confidence that this crown has put in the republic, in consequence of all that has been mentioned above, that it must be looked on as equally unnatural and unjustifiable, that in spite of all these strong and invincible reasons, a government so wise and so prudent as that of the republic is by all the world allowed to be, should determine to act in a manner so diametrically opposite to them.

VI. That the extinguishing the power of *France*, is humanly speaking, and by the divine will, above the power of all its enemies, but supposing that the republic should have the good luck to employ its forces in such a work, and to see it crowned with all the success she could possibly desire, would it then be any other thing than overturning

the sole counterpoise on which its safety depends, and burying itself in the ruin of this power its ally?

VII. And finally, that if without any regard to all these reasons, the republic should at last determine to enter into a war against *France*, this would visibly and incontestably prove, that there is an inveterate and implacable hatred in the republic against this crown, or that the state is entirely at the beck of *England*, and absolutely in dependance on her; but from which soever of these two principles the enmity may flow, the necessary result must be the destroying effectually and for ever the friendship this crown has always had for the republic, and fill the hearts of all this nation with dispositions like those which the state must manifest, by pursuing such a conduct.

I could not give any manner of answer to all this, because I assure you upon my word, that there is not a single person, either member of the government or private man, who has given me the least intelligence of what has been expressed as the sentiments of their high mightinesses, in their deliberations on this subject.

Only I find my self obliged to add, that I may give you a perfect state of the case, that those who endeavour to make their high
mightinesses

mightinesses believe, that the destruction of this crown would be a very easy enterprize, either mistake themselves, or are imposed upon by others; because humanly speaking, the forces of *France* ought to be considered as invincible, when employed only in her own defence. The true understanding of this affair seems to be of the last consequence to their high mightinesses, for I dare not suppose their intention to be by a vain shew of hate and enmity, and with a prodigious dissipation of their forces to make of so puissant a friend an enemy infinitely dangerous to this republick.

The cardinal seemed to me extremely touched at the news before mentioned, and you cannot be surprized, because you know the affectionate sentiments that minister has for the republic, and as he has always declared, that to engage the republic in a war will infallibly draw after it the loss of its liberty, and consequently of its prosperity, of its commerce, of its navigation, of its glory, and of all that renders it at present so distinguished. One of the ministers speaking of the old artifices the *English* practised from a persuasion they know perfectly well how to make the state dance in the spring, compared the caresses used by the *English*, in order to succeed in their views on the republic to the bites of the tarantula, which obliges those who feel them to dance without

out pause or rest, till their force is quite extinguished, which is the true dance of death.

You easily apprehend, Sir, that they fail not often to repeat to me what they have frequently heretofore touched upon, as to the old hatred and envy of *England* against our nation and republic, on account of its commerce and navigation, how the *English* attempted in the very dawn of the republic, by the help of the earl of *Leicester*, to have brought it under its yoke, fomenting in order thereto the most desperate seditions, under the false pretences of religion and liberty being in danger; how, after both *Cromwell* and *Charles II.* laboured to subvert it totally, calling it in respect to them another *Carthage*. That in 1664, in the midst of peace, and while king *Charles* flattered the state, and in a manner stifled it with caresses, his fleet drove the *Hollanders* from some very considerable settlements they had formed in what was then called the *New Netherlands*, and at present *New York*. How soon after, that is to say in 1672, the same king, taking advantage from the discontent conceived by *France* against the republic, for having, through the persuasion of the *English* themselves, entered into the tripple alliance, took occasion to engage, by his own proper councils, that crown in a detestable treaty, for sharing the spoils of this republic between *France* and *England*, and attacked her jointly;

ly ; and how the sovereignty of the province of *Holland*, in favour of the prince of *Orange* nephew to king *Charles II.* was one of the points of satisfaction which *England* exacted from the republic. How *England* having found the secret of engaging the regency of the republic in a war against *France* and *Spain*, under pretence of the dangers to which they said both liberty and religion stood exposed, and to charge the vessel of the state in such a manner that had almost sunk her to the bottom, by a most ruinous war, under the specious veil of humbling the exorbitant power of this crown, and to prevent the re-union of the two crowns on the same head ; and in what manner the *English*, in getting out of that war, proved to all the world that these fine pretences and specious stories, were only so many snares laid by them, in order to draw in the state, and ruin its naval forces and commerce, by the state itself, and its own proper arms, to that degree of declension in which we see it at this day, and to elevate on its ruins the naval force and commerce of the *English* to such a degree, as to incline them to think it their right, and to fill them with a desire of giving law to all the four quarters of the globe ; and how a close union between *France* and the republic, was the only counterpoise the wit of man could devise, to hinder the *English* from acquiring
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the absolute dominion of the sea, and to preserve the independency of this republic on that imperious nation. That this same union was also the only buckler of the republic against whatever they might have to fear from any other quarter whatever; and, in fine, how the *English* employed all sorts of methods to excite a general hatred between this nation and ours; and all that they thereby may be able, by the fingers of the republic (how much they may be burn'd in the operation signifies not much) to draw the chefnuts out of the fire.

I don't enter into the detail of other points, not to trouble their high mightinesses with repetitions which they have heretofore informed me are by no means agreeable to them. I am very far from desiring to excite any animosities between our nation and the *English*; for I condemn these piques and lusts of vengeance, as follies of the highest kind; and I detest them as things which tend to stifle all sentiments of religion. In fine, I know very well that I do not speak to the people, but to the noble regency, in time and place in which it is convenient; and I speak, as it is my duty, and as we are now pretty near the same rocks and shoals, against which the vessel of the state has struck so rudely, as to be in danger of foundering; and as the same causes will produce the same effects, I
thought

thought that this short recapitulation might serve as a kind of light to some of our brave pilots in steering amidst so many dangers.

I am, &c.

Paris, Jan. 11.

1743.

M. Van Hoey to M. Fagel.

S I R,

IN the augmentation of the cavalry some changes have been made, so that instead of 300 new troops of horse and dragoons, there will be but 76; and the rest of the augmentation will be effected by adding five men to each troop that is now on foot, and making them thereby 41 compleat. Besides this augmentation of the cavalry and the seven new *German* batallions, as also besides 50 or 60 batallions of militia, this crown will have in the ensuing spring an army of 92,000 foot, and 23,000 horse, including the troops from *Prague* to be employed on the frontiers of the kingdom, on the side of the *Low Countries*, in case of necessity. This is a truth of which I can assure their high mightinesses from my own clear and perfect knowledge, and upon this they may very safely rely.

The general opinion here is, that if the state should, by its actions, give any grounds

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of

of suspicion that it intends to favour the house of *Austria* and *England* against this crown, the court will not fail to recall into this kingdom all the forces that are in *Bavaria*; and I find no body that is a competent judge of these matters, who is not perfectly clear, that *France*, having once this army in her own dominions, will have nothing to fear from the strongest and best concerted alliance that can be made either with respect to the conquest of the kingdom, or the abatement of its power; for as you very well know, Sir, every war that has hitherto been carried on by an offensive alliance, has been less warmly pushed by some of the confederates than by others, and as constantly ended by the different parties making each a separate peace.

I perceive that all sensible people are extremely apprehensive that the republic having sharpen'd the spirits of the people to so high a degree, will find, when it is too late, that instead of water, they will be only able to furnish oil to this fire, in order to make it burn with the greater vehemence.

The same persons conceive, that to oblige *France* to recall her troops, and afterwards transfer the scene of war into the *Low Countries*, instead of advancing the interest of the house of *Austria*, and securing the balance, will serve only to distress the one, and expose the other to the greatest dangers.

One

One reason amongst many is, that it appears even by the confession of the house of *Austria*, which is an indisputable proof, that it depends only upon itself to make peace on terms perfectly agreeable to its interest ; and all things clearly prove, that the princes of the empire, and in a particular manner the king of *Prussia*, can never suffer the house of *Austria* to render herself mistress of the imperial crown by force of arms, or that she should annex the dominions of *Bavaria* to those of her patrimony : so that a war commenced by the house of *Austria* in order to carry into execution either of these designs, would necessarily draw on a civil war, in which all *Germany* must be involved ; from whence must result the extreme weakening of all its princes, and as a necessary consequence, the total destruction of the ballance of *Europe*.

I write this on *Tuesday* evening, after having sent this morning to learn news of the cardinal's health. His eminency had last night a fit of a high fever, and is now in a very dangerous way ; in short, he seems to be hastening, and that a pretty quick pace too, towards his end.

I have spoke since to some ministers at court, whom I find entirely in the same sentiments with respect to the circumstances of the times ; but above all, with regard to the pacific dispositions of the republic, and

its constant attachment to the friendship of this crown, as I have often said in my former, and repeated in my two last. For as the acknowledgment of the above-mention'd queen plainly proves, that her war is no longer a defensive war, as their high mightinesses have so solemnly declared to this court, that they are under no engagement to offend any one whatsoever; that, in a manner altogether as formal, they have given the strongest assurances that they would not fail to render it visible by the course of their conduct, that it was their sincere intention to maintain the strictest friendship and good harmony between this crown and the republic. The ministers drew from thence this conclusion, that the amity between this crown and our nation is entirely out of danger, notwithstanding the most violent efforts of those who labour to set them together by the ears.

This consequence drawn from the declarations of their high mightinesses, passes for a certainty, from the high and general esteem that they have here for the republic: so that to suppose it capable of speaking in one manner, and acting in quite another, is as opposite to that established character for wisdom which their high mightinesses have here, as a lye is contrary to truth. Religion and reason equally condemn an action of this nature, as a cowardly and scandalous vice,

vice, which experience has at all times proved to be downright madness, in a less powerful state to one much more potent.

They put me at the same time in mind of a maxim taught us by nature, and which is founded on the *law of nations*, viz. that a third power, tho' it doth not directly commit any hostility, declares itself however an enemy, by putting it in the power of one party to attack the other with greater strength; and by this means the republic, by sending its troops into the *Austrian Netherlands*, will give an opportunity to the queen of *Hungary*, and at the same time to *England*, to employ all their forces in conquering the dominions of the house of *Bavaria*, and to make themselves masters of the *Imperial* crown in favour of the grand duke, by a war that must turn all *Germany* upside-down; a fault that the republic will dearly pay for, by the loss of her liberty, without taking this into the account, that by such a step the state declares itself, tho' indirectly, yet in a manner equally essential, an enemy to the emperor, to the empire, and to this crown. *France* finding itself bound and engaged by the most sacred treaties, as well as by the maxims of its government, indispensibly to protect both the one and the other, will by this means find itself constrained, contrary to its inclination, and against its will, to push on as well as to continue a most ruinous war.

This

This evening the cardinal finds himself a little better, notwithstanding which they thought fit to administer to him the *extreme unction*, because he desired it.

This day, being *Wednesday* morning, I am informed, that his eminency has slept better last night, and that his cough is less violent. This afternoon the king made him a visit, and he has grown better and better all this day. The night between *Wednesday* and *Thursday* he was not so easy as that preceeding, and tho' his eminency finds himself better to-day than he was on *Tuesday* last, yet his condition is extremely doubtful.

If providence should be pleased to remove this great minister, the republic will certainly lose here a sincere friend, and one who was in high credit. But I dare take upon me to assure their high mightinesses, that the interest of their state stands here still on a good foundation; so that it will depend entirely on themselves to strengthen and cultivate this friendship by a pure exerting of their virtues, and consequently in a manner which has in it nothing contrary to the friendship subsisting between the state and all other powers, and whence they may reap the richest harvest by realizing the sincere interest that all the *French* nation takes in the preservation of the republic and the augmentation of its commerce. But you know, Sir, that as friend-

friendship begets friendship, so its contrary necessarily produces fruits resembling itself.

I am not ignorant (because it is a thing common amongst men) that in case it should please God to preserve peace to the state, there will not be wanting a set of people who will constantly assert that we had done better to have engaged in the war; and by this means my application and my fidelity, in informing their high mightinesses of all that occurred to me for the preservation of peace, which ought to be so dear to us, will certainly be far from acquiring me either the favour or the esteem of such persons. But their high mightinesses know, that the welfare of my country is all things to me; so that I had much rather choose to see myself oppressed by the most outrageous hatred, and by the most mortifying contempt, provided the republic remains in peace, than to hear in succeeding times my pacific sentiments cried up to the skies in the republic, as well as in this kingdom, compelled thereto by the sad experience of the frightful calamities of war.

It is certain, that the *Imperial* court is already not altogether content with that of *France*, and least of all with the conduct of *M. Broglio*, because she suspects that the court has more at heart the re-establishment of peace, than the obtaining for her such a satisfaction as is reasonable, in regard to her pretensions on the succession of the late emperor.

peror. They likewise conceive M. Bröglis either neglected or avoided making himself master of *Passaw* and *Scharding*, when it was in his power. The report is current, that the marshal made very strong representations, in order to have got the *French* troops recalled from *Bavaria*; and it is very positively said, that the troops which have lately left *Prague* will continue their march directly for this kingdom.

Yesterday in the evening, the cardinal found himself less at ease, and you will see by the billet I have just now received from *Iffy*, that his eminency is in the most dangerous situation, that can be.

Paris, Jan.
18, 1742.

I am, &c.

Friday 7 in the Morning.

The looseness his eminency had all day yesterday, reduced to him the lowest pass imaginable; he is delirious by intervals, his cough is not quite so hard, but he has still a great difficulty in expectorating. He has a good deal of trouble in swallowing, which makes him refuse liquids, and all sort of nourishment.

M.

M. *Van Hoey* to M. *Fagel*.

S I R,

AS there is no confirmation of the news, that has been spread here for some time, of the deliberation of their high mightinesses, about employing a great part of their troops, for the service of the queen of *Hungary*, in order to put her in a condition for carrying on an offensive war, either directly against this crown, or at least against the emperor, we begin at last to doubt more and more of the truth of these rumours, especially amongst the wiser and graver sort of people. For without mentioning the intire confidence this nation places in the high wisdom, candour and peaceable disposition of their high mightinesses, there is no body here, that does not look upon it as a demonstration, that the real establishment of the repose of *Europe*, will be the necessary consequence of their prudent and moderate conduct.

A new report begins to spread here intirely opposite to one that went before it, by which it was pretended, that the king of *Prussia*, had been drawn into a scheme of engaging in a war against this crown, of which I took notice in my most humble letter of the 4th instant. At present they
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give out, that his majesty has declared to the king of *England*, that he cannot suffer *English* troops, or any other in the pay of *England*, to enter the empire in order to continue the war, that as an elector and prince of the empire, he is obliged to maintain its peace, and therefore he will take upon himself to oblige the troops of *France* to retire, and offers to labour in conjunction with *England*, and the republick to procure a peace upon equitable terms between the emperor and the house of *Austria*.

But nothing of this kind has come to me at all, through the canal of the ministry of this court, and I find that some other persons, for whose judgment I have a great respect, give no credit at all to this report, and for the following reason.

That all these people lay it down as a fact, that while the war is carrying on in *Germany* in a manner with equal advantages, and consequently with equal diminution of strength to all parties, the king of *Prussia* will not take any part; but if it should so happen that one of the parties, and especially the house of *Austria* should incline the balance a little too much on her side, he would immediately put an end to the war by an armed mediation; and that, for the very same reason, he will never admit the house of *Austria* to possess itself of the dominions

of *Bavaria*, much less of the imperial crown. This is the unanimous opinion of all sorts of persons, and I may say, that there is not the least variation in sentiment about it.

It is generally given out, that the king of *Poland*, as elector of *Saxony*, has a mind to insist upon his pretensions on the dutchies of *Juliers* and *Berg*, whence many people are apprehensive lest *England*, and the queen of *Hungary*, should lay hold on this opportunity of engaging that prince also in a war against the emperor, and against *France*.

The present situation of affairs in *Lombardy* are such, that the king of *Sardinia*, having withdrawn the best part of his troops into *Piedmont*, the *Austrians* are no longer in a condition to make head against the *Spaniards* under *M. De Gages*, which creates a new motive to apprehend, that while they flatter the queen with promises of enlarging her dominions at the expence of the emperor, or of this crown, by the continuance of the war, the event will but too fatally prove the solid reasonings of those who judge, that there is nothing more necessary or expedient for the queen in particular, or the good of *Europe* in general, than a peace, in which due care shall be taken of her arch-ducal house.

I find my self obliged to add to what I have been just now saying, that this reflection makes it more and more evident to every prudent and impartial person, that it is abso-

lutely impossible for the queen of *Hungary* to make any conquest upon the emperor, or this crown; and that the evidence of this truth ought to make it firmly believed that the conduct of this princess, who prefers the continuance of a desolating and dangerous war to a peace extremely favourable for her, ought to be attributed rather to the quick temper of the queen than to the deliberate councils of *England*, or any other power.

On *Friday* morning the cardinal being still in the same condition, his valet de chambre asked him if his eminency would not take a little cinnamon water? to which he answered tartly * *I will have neither cinnamon water nor rabble.* But a moment after, he call'd him back and said, " give me some cinnamon water, because it comes from our good friends the *Dutch*, and I would not displease them."

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Paris, Jan.
21. 1743.

Sir, yours, &c.

* This is what the *French* call *jeu de mots*, or a playing upon words. Those of the cardinal were *je ne veux ne canelle ni canaille*, the turn lies on the like sound of the words *canelle* and *canaille*, and, as the story is reported by others, was occasioned by his eminency's apartment being too much crowded.

M.

M. *Van Hoey* to M. *Fagel*.

S I R,

FROM the conversation I had last *Tuesday* with the ministers at *Versailles*, it appears to me afresh, and in the clearest manner possible, that this court is still in the same disposition, with respect to the re-establishment of peace, as I have often informed their high mightinesses, and that she sincerely desires that the court of *Vienna* would at last give her consent to an accommodation upon equal terms, and which are consequently agreeable to the interest of the house of *Austria*.

Cardinal *Tencin* speaking on this occasion of true greatness of soul, and comparing it with the passions that often assume an hypocritical figure of that rare virtue, told me, that the idea of the sage conduct of the states-general, had engaged him to frame of their way of thinking, obliged him firmly to believe, that their high mightinesses, only from their affection for the queen, and for the common good of mankind, were not less disposed to employ their treasures for softning the heart of the princess, and inclining her to an accommodation on such terms as I before hinted, than others were ready to offer the lavishing away of theirs to divert

vert her from taking so salutary a resolution, and to engage her to persist in the continuation of the war, at the risk of her hereditary dominions, the destruction of the human race, and principally of her own subjects.

A person of distinction, and in a situation of judging, by his own lights, of this case, informed me, that the situation of affairs in *America* is such that it is impossible for *Spain* to grant any augmentation of territories to the *English*, without exposing it self to the greatest danger of seeing their subjects shortly driven all out of that part of the world; and as to new advantages that it was expected they should grant the *English* nation, as to their commerce in *Spanish America*, the necessary result must be the total ruin of the trade carried on by the way of *Cadiz*, by which means the dominions of *Spain* in *America* would become a useless and even ruinous charge upon that crown.

The same person told me, that he had it in such a manner that left him no room to doubt that the court of *Spain* was too thoroughly sensible of these truths to flatter themselves that any negociations, which have these two points I mention in view, can ever succeed, but that they must always meet with difficulties that are insurmountable; but you know, Sir, because I have heretofore, more than once mentioned it to their high mightinesses,

nesses that on the other side, the apprehensions of this court are very strong, that the acquisition of some establishment for *Don Philip* in *Italy* may have so sensible an effect on the temper of the court of *Spain*, that they may think no price too great to attain it, and be thereby led to make these two great sacrifices to *England*, how pernicious soever the consequences may prove for *Spain* itself, as well as for other nations.

Having written thus much of this dispatch, I received the resolution of their high mightinesses of the 15th instant. They will easily judge of the grief I felt at seeing that I have had the misfortune to displease them, at a time when I labour with the utmost sincerity, to discharge my duty towards my country. I am a man, I acknowledge my weakness, it belongs to their high mightinesses to command, and me to obey.

But you will have the goodness, Sir, with respect to the reasons mentioned in my dispatch of the 11th instant, which engaged me to inform their high mightinesses succinctly and faithfully what I was told here (though in terms much less warm and circumstantial) of the conduct that *England* hath held towards the republic since its establishment, to add these that follow.

The first reason is, the persuasion of the cardinal, and the other ministers of this court (of which I have before taken notice
more

more than once to their high mightinesses) that the keeping up a strict friendship with *England* by all just and convenient ways, is not less necessary for the republic, than the entertaining a like correspondence with this crown. Whence it follows, that this court never had it in view to excite any animosities against *England*.

The second, that the cardinal, when he made on *Wednesday* fortnight that recital to me, though much more circumstantially, added these words, " You know, Sir, how
 " far I am from raising any animosity in
 " the republic against *England*; I only put
 " you in mind of things which ought to
 " make the republic careful of giving too
 " easy credit to the fair words of the *Eng-*
 " *lish*; the experience of all ages ought to
 " teach them, that the old proverb, *what*
 " *is bred in the bone, will never come out of*
 " *the skin*, is applicable in the highest de-
 " gree to that nation."

The third reason is, that it appears to me from frequent discourses with the ministers, that this court strongly imagines that the negotiations of the *English* to engage this state in a war, are push'd with very great heat, and with much appearance of success. I therefore thought that it was my duty to conceal nothing from their high mightinesses of all that occurred to me at this time for the maintaining the peace, my instruc-

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tions requiring, amongst other things, *to inform exactly their high mightinesses of all that should come to my knowledge, when things are of any importance, as well in respect to my commission as otherwise.*

The fourth reason is, that my instructions direct me *to labour that the good intelligence between the two courts and the two nations, may be preserved in all respects, and cemented more and more.* As also because their high mightinesses, by several of their resolutions, and particularly that of the 20th of *July* last, have testified their satisfaction with regard to my conduct, in that I strove to convince this court of the sincere desire their high mightinesses had to cultivate a mutual friendship between the two nations, and to eradicate all suspicions and distrusts: so that I thought, that as the before-mentioned detail was made with no other view than to combat the efforts of those who endeavour to excite animosities between this crown and the republic, it was my duty to acquaint their high mightinesses for the same end.

The fifth reason is, that with respect to all the before-mentioned motives, I had strongly persuaded myself that the resolution of the 20th of *July* last, related to nothing but what I had said in public, as to the manner in which the *English* think with respect to this republic; for that resolution does not direct me to conceal from their

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high mightinesses whatever should be said to me directly in quality of ambassador by the ministers of this court, for the maintenance of the peace and mutual friendship between the two nations.

I farther most religiously protest, that the preserving our friendship with *England* is not less at my heart, than that of maintaining a good intelligence with *France*, and that I would labour with the same fidelity and the same application, if my employment required it, to prevent the republic's entertaining any groundless suspicions against *England*, if they tended to induce a pernicious war between that nation and ours, because I consider peace as the most precious treasure of the state, and the friendship of the two crowns, that of *England* as well as that of *France*, as its firmest support.

It is said, that the king seeing the dying condition of the cardinal, has taken a resolution, that in case he loses this minister, he will not replace him, but apply himself to business, and discharge it by the help of the secretaries of state in their several departments. However, the multiplicity of affairs in this vast kingdom, and more especially in a time of war, makes it believed that he cannot, without the greatest difficulty, avoid continuing the direction of affairs on the same foot, and conferring on one of his ministers an authority superior to the rest.

The

The dauphin going last *Tuesday* to visit the cardinal, his eminency told him, *That princes of his rank were seldom accustomed to honour with their presence a person in the agonies of death. That however these visits could not but be of use to him, since they would oblige him to consider the misery of human nature more nearly, by putting him in mind that even princes are but men, and that sooner or later the same fate must attend them.*

All who have access to the cardinal tell me, that his eminency even in these days, which humanly speaking, are the last of his life, preserves for the republic, and their ambassador here, the same sentiments of friendship that I have so often told your high mightinesses were so natural to his eminency; however, that I might not trouble him in the visit I made him yesterday at *Iffy*, I did not think it proper to go near his bedside.

Paris, Jan.
25. 1743.

I am yours, &c.

M. Van Hoey to M. Fagel.

S I R,

IN the conversation I had last *Tuesday* with the ministers of this court at *Versailles*, they all spoke to me, at first sight, of the resolution of their high mightinesses of the

15th of last month, taken on my account, because it is now become public in this city. I forebear touching any particular therein, because I could not well do that without incurring the greatest danger of being thought disobedient to those orders that it contains.

But before we go further, let me have leave to open my heart to their high mightinesses, and represent to them in the most respectful manner :

In the *first* place, that the resolution of their high mightinesses has thrown me into the greatest dejection of mind, notwithstanding my employment demands, and above all, in the present conjuncture of affairs, a double portion of courage and vigilance : but perhaps this difficulty may be surmounted by the confidence I place in the equity of their high mightinesses. One and the other you know, Sir, are the most glorious recompence, and at the same time the most indisputable testimony of a clear conscience, which, by the grace of God, I have always preserved.

In the *second* place, that all my dispatches through the course of fifteen years prove, that I have never amused myself in picking up vague reports, or vain discourses, in order to engage the republic in a ruinous war or a deceitful peace ; and that I never offered to their high mightinesses any advices that were not founded on a perfect knowledge of the nature of things, on reason, and the experience
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of all ages; advices that serve principally to the just discharge of my duty, and the fulfilling my instructions; *to labour in general for the preservation of the good intelligence and friendship between both states and their subjects, and cement it more and more*; and that all suspicions and false informations might be refuted, and even prevented, according to the resolutions and repeated orders of their high mightinesses.

In the *third* place, that all my dispatches are so many authentic proofs that the whole of my policy, which is perfectly simple and uniform, is founded entirely and invariably on the following maxims:

- I. On this, that we are commanded to be watchful for our own preservation, relying still on God's providence, *vigilate deo confidentes*; reposing ourselves wholly upon his goodness, and not on men, whose passions overcome their reason.
- II. To stifle all false suspicions and distrust in their cradle, by giving and receiving timely explications; because in proportion as suspicions gain strength, they necessarily excite groundless prejudices and violent animosities, which at last burst out in an open and ruinous war.
- III. To take all possible methods for preventing envy, and the desire of vengeance

geance, nature, reason and experience shewing us the folly of these outrageous passions, and our holy religion condemning them in the highest degree.

IV. And lastly securing the peace of the republick, as far as humanly speaking is possible by the virtues of such as are intrusted with our government, and through their regulating their actions, according to the fruitful rule of our blessed saviour, who directs us to do to others, what we desire they should do unto us.

So that when their high mightinesses by their resolution of the 15th of last month, seem to impute to my dispatches, views and sentiments directly opposite to those, which I have been recapitulating, tho' my candour and my sincerity are manifest in my relations, as they have been always the rule of my conduct, from my youth up to this day ; I cannot but conceive from thence, new and strong apprehensions, that those to whom my labours and continual application for cementing good intelligence and amity displease, have at last succeeded in rendering me suspected, and consequently hateful and contemptible to their high mightinesses to the total destruction of my ministry.

However it is not fit for me thereupon to desire my recall (though that is absolutely necessary,

necessary, to secure my having bread to eat in my old age) because their high mightinesses have heretofore declared, that my recall would be extremely prejudicial to the service of the state. For my part, desiring as I do with all my heart and soul, to sacrifice my life and fortune, for the preservation of the peace and liberty, and promoting the prosperity of the republic, not only in this employment, but in all others in which the state may have need of me, I devote and consecrate myself to the service of my country, without reserve or exception.

But notwithstanding all this, I cannot help praying constantly and ardently to God, and that so loud that all the members of the regency may hear me, that he would incline their hearts, so that, in the choice of some other person for the embassy of *France*, they may meet with one endowed with greater talents, who has fewer imperfections, and whose breast glows with as warm a passion for whatever regards his duty towards his country, and that he will inspire them with a resolution of granting me repose, after so many years fatigue, of sacrifices made for the republick, and of a conduct always disinterested, when my own concerns only were at stake.

The cardinal was on *Tuesday* morning last at extremity, which gives me occasion to speak of the sincere sentiments of this minister

nister for the republick and for me ; and to write, at the same time, that, as I know these are the sentiments of the whole nation, I dare assure their high mightinesses, that every one who speaks to me demonstrates by actions and by facts, that they really think, and will ever think in the same way, with respect to the republic, so long as she continues in friendship with this crown.

I should be in the wrong however, if I concealed from their high mightinesses, that this court, as far as I am able to judge, does not count so positively as heretofore she did, on the unalterable attachment of the republic, to peace, and her friendship with this crown.

But that this may not surprize their high mightinesses it ought to be considered that, according to the natural corruption of the human heart, there are to be found here as well as every where else, certain public incendiaries, who love to fish in troubled waters, and to consider war as their greatest good, and peace as their greatest evil, and that it is no less natural to people of this stamp to make an ill use of every thing, with a view to raise reciprocal animosities. For this reason they will endeavour, with equal application to impute to the state, sentiments altogether contrary to their friendship to this crown, while they privately suggest to the state, in order to render this crown suspected,
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that it gives into certain schemes tending to overturn the liberty of the republick, and to destroy our holy religion.

As the cardinal loved the republick at the bottom of his heart, this advantageous disposition helped me much in preventing or destroying in his mind, all sorts of ill impressions, suspicions and distrusts. There was something so rare in this favourable disposition, that the like is hardly to be found in any minister in a foreign court, and this was the more necessary at present, because the state has truly and effectually at heart, the continuation of this friendship, that one may have, while there is yet time, recourse to explications, which are certainly the only and best specifics against all sorts of sinister suspicions.

All who knew the cardinal ever so little inwardly, have always looked upon him as the great antagonist of the designs of the court of *Spain*, and their high mightinesses must also have remarked in my relations, and elsewhere the dislike of that court towards the cardinal, so that by them his death will never be look'd on as a loss.

This is one reason, whence it is here inferred that in all appearance, the court of *France* will not labour for the future with the same zeal, as she has certainly done for these six months past, to dispose the emperor to content himself with his own dominions,

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in case the queen of *Hungary* would on that condition be disposed to make peace ; because by the peace the queen of *Hungary* would find herself in a situation to employ all her forces in the defence of her dominions in *Italy*, and to render abortive the enterprizes of the *Spaniards* in that part of our continent.

To this reason we must join another. That is the alteration of affairs in *Italy*, and the courage which this change hath inspir'd in the court of *Spain*, insomuch that she now flatters herself with the certain hopes of conducting her schemes to a prosperous end ; so that she would be much more offended, if at present *France* should put an end to her enterprizes, and frustrate by a peace between the emperor and the queen, an undertaking in their opinion so well founded.

But this difficulty is not among the number of those that are insurmountable, because the whole *French* nation cries aloud for peace ; and the ministers, in the conversation of which I have given an account, seem to me equally disposed to the re-establishment of repose. All of them have testified to me, that this court would be extremely well pleased if their high mightinesses would employ their good offices with the emperor and the house of *Austria*, in order to procure a peace on the foot of the
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uti possidetis, which seems to be a very clear proof of the sincerity of their intentions ; because in case (say they) that this proposition should not be accepted by both parties, their high mightinesses would at least be themselves made sensible how far the queen's war is consistent with the terms of the alliances and engagements of the republic.

I have this moment received the resolution of their high mightinesses of the 22d of last month, taken on one of my former dispatches of the 18th. Put yourself, Sir, (or any other member of the regency) in my place but for a moment, and you will the more easily judge of the extremity of the grief I feel from this resolution, I shall therefore add nothing to what I have already said above, or to what you will find in my dispatch of the 25th of last month, in answer to a resolution of their high mightinesses of the 15th preceding. My clear conscience serves me instead of a thousand witnesses, and my entire confidence in the justice of the state, as a buckler of proof, which hinders me from being intirely stunn'd by this redoubled blow.

As to the rest, the national troops of *France* are all marched out of the city of *Egra*, and they are replaced there by some regiments belonging to the emperor.

It is certain that the court of *France* is resolved at present not to draw out of *Ba-*

varia, or march towards this kingdom, more than 6000 men only, including horse and foot ; and that the dispositions are made for having the army of *France* which is left in that electorate, compleated by the end of *March*, or the beginning of *April* next.

The pay of the *French* horse and foot in *Bavaria* has been augmented two sols *per diem*, and orders are given for distributing besides two ounces of rice a day to every man.

The loan of six millions, by way of *ton-tine*, of which I spoke in my last, was filled the very day it was opened, so that the next day there was not a single ticket to be had.

The king has declared to his ministers, that for the future he will confer with them in person, and that they are to receive his orders from himself.

This new system of the administration of affairs at this court, will in all appearance be lasting, by reason that the ministers of state are all equally averse from desiring to try the weight of so heavy a burthen as that of the general ministry, or to see themselves exercising only a subordinate authority under a superior taken from among their own body ; from whence it will necessarily result, that every one will contribute sincerely to the preserving a perfect harmony, as well for facilitating the king's business, as because it is their common interest.

I forgot to take notice above, and in its proper place, that the ill-will of the court of *Spain* against the cardinal, has gone so far, that the marquis *de Castellar* was particularly charged to labour by all means to ruin this prime minister in the opinion of the king, and to procure his disgrace ; and that the marquis *de las Minas* has testified, by all his actions, that the ruin of the cardinal was one of the principal objects of his embassy to this court.

Their high mightinesses will easily comprehend that the court of *Spain* could not want abundance of friends in a business like this, where many people, for the advancing their own interest, are accustomed to regulate their measures by very distant views, and to whom the case of a prince of the *Spanish* line mounting the throne of *France*, doth not appear at all impossible. We ought to add the liberality of the court of *Spain*, which lavishes to the principal lords of this court the order of the Golden Fleece, and even the title of *Grande*es ; this last dignity giving here the same rank, and the same prerogatives, as the brevet of duke and peer.

When one observes that notwithstanding all this, and without considering that his most catholic majesty is uncle to the king of *France*, the cardinal has testified by all his actions, that never any hopes of acquiring
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the good will of the court of *Spain*, or any dread of its hate or persecution, could possibly turn him out of the right road, or divert him from his duty, it looks as if one could not exact a more convincing proof of his love for the king his master, or of his total devotion to the concerns of the nation, without any mixture of his particular interests.

I had likewise forgot to mention that, upon the good offices I have employed in favour of the republick of *Geneva*, the ministers have informed me, that the king will never abandon them, but that he will protect it towards all, and against all who shall attempt any thing to its prejudice, in the manner that is most efficacious. They add that the infraction made on the treaty of *St. Julian*, has, in all appearance, its source from the ignorance of the *Spaniards*, but that at all events this court will not fail of setting that of *Spain* right in this affair.

In order to explain more clearly a period in my last dispatch, which begins with these words, *They all testified, to me, that this court would see with pleasure, &c.* I find myself obliged to observe further, that none of the principal ministers in this beginning of a new system can speak so positively of the intentions of the king, as in the time of the cardinal; they then knew those of his eminency, and they understood perfectly well

well to what a degree the king reposed confidence in that prime minister. I am

Paris, Feb.
13, 1743.

Yours, &c.

M. Van Hoey to M. Fagel.

S I R,

THE minister of the republic of *Geneva* has informed me, that upon his representations he has received the very same assurances from *M. Amelot*, which that minister and the other members of the ministry had given me, of which I had the honour to give an account to the state in my former.

Letters from the army of *France*, which is in *Bavaria*, inform us, that the diseases increase among the troops, and that, as they attribute them to the bad diet and other inconveniencies they meet with, *M. Broglio* had extorted the generals and colonels of regiments to do, each, all that lay in his power towards putting a stop to this malady by removing its sources. In the mean time, the court has laboured with such diligence to replace the losses of this army, that the recruits, to the number of 2250 men, which were necessary for that purpose, and which were drawn out of the militia, are already arrived at *Strasburg*, where the marquis de
Quincy

Quincy is gone, in order to review them, so that we reckon they will arrive before the 15th of next month, at the army in *Bavaria*.

The return of the army under M. *Bellisle* has been hastened, insomuch that the first division began its march on the 20th, instead of the 24th, of last month, and the last will follow on the fourth instant, instead of the 11th.

We are assured that several regiments of horse and foot have begun their march on the side of *Luxemburgh*, in order to be ready in case the *Austrian* troops and their auxiliaries should attempt an invasion of the kingdom of that side.

The 72 new raised troops of horse and dragoons are almost all compleat, but the ordinances for augmenting each troop of horse and dragoons with 5 men are not yet issued.

It is said, that the infant don *Philip* has demanded of the regency of the country of *Valais*, in which is the mountain called *Great St. Bernard*, a passage through their territory, in order to enter into *Italy*; but it is supposed they will find it pretty difficult to persuade them to it.

The king has given two abbies, which were held by the late cardinal, to two abbès who are brothers, and nephews of his eminency, viz. that of *St. Stephen*, of 35,000
livres

livres a-year to the eldest, who is also grand almoner to the queen ; and that of *Tournay*, which is worth 16,000 livres, to the younger.

The cardinal had besides 40,000 livres a year, *viz.* 20,000 as superintendant of the posts, and the like sum as minister of state, which is the fixed appointment of that employment : so that his whole revenue did not amount to more than 91,000 livres *French* money. He has left no debt, his manner of living being very modest ; and when one considers his rank, and the customs of the present age, one is surprized to hear that his whole estate, including his furniture, plate and jewels, did not amount to above 80,000 livres of that money. This is the clearest proof possible of the cleanness of his hands, and consequently of his heart.

I shall add upon this occasion what the cardinal told me some years ago, because it is a fact that does equal honour to his most christian majesty and to his minister. The king immediately after his coronation at *Reims*, having heard it said to his old preceptor, that his majesty was now to take his leave of truth for ever, the young prince asked him with great astonishment why ? and having received for answer, that truth was chased from the thrones of kings by flattery, that monarch said in the most gracious manner possible, *for my part, Sir, I desire you always tell me the truth.* The

cardinal when he told me this added, that having promised the king never to disguise any thing to him, he had religiously kept his word: that he had never been afraid to tell him all things naturally and without disguise, tho' sometimes they were very opposite to that monarch's inclinations and way of thinking, and consequently disagreeable: that even this had never cost him any pain, because, added he, daring to speak the most disagreeable truths to kings, is always a most evident mark of sincere respect and true affection for their sacred persons: that besides, he was able to act in this manner with less apprehension than another, because he knew perfectly well the temper of the king, and the magnanimity of his heart; so that he had never occasion to behold him but with the eyes of a faithful subject, or to speak to him but as the head of the state, and the father of his people.

This was the occasion of the great discontent shewn by the court of *Spain* against the cardinal, and of a commission given to the marquis *de Castellar*, to endeavour to procure his disgrace, as I have before observed.

The cardinal added farther, that he was sensibly mortified at being sometimes obliged to give his majesty advice contrary to the views of the court of *Spain*, because he always looked upon the friendship of that
court

court as extremely precious to the *French* nation; but that it was impossible to serve two masters at a time. That he looked upon peace as the sovereign blessing of *France*, and war as the greatest misfortune which could befall that nation, without however being able to find the secret to bring near each other these extremities of *the greatest good* and *the greatest evil*. That the welfare of the people was always the supreme rule of his councils, because there really lies the great glory of sovereigns, inasmuch as from thence they derive their surest support.

The body of the late cardinal remains at *Iffy*, till such time as the superb mausoleum, the king has ordered to be erected in the church of *St. Thomas* of the *Louvre*, which has been rebuilt upon this occasion, and which is henceforward to be called *St. Louis* of the *Louvre*, is finished; but in the mean time the king has ordered, that the most magnificent obsequies shall be celebrated for the deceased in the metropolitan church of this capital. The affliction of heart which the king hath in the most sincere manner shewn in all his actions, as well as in all his expressions, for the loss of this great minister, forms his fairest elogium; for to love and to regret the virtuous is always considered as the most indubitable mark of real virtue. The king has given to M. *Amelot*

the office of great master of the ceremonies of the order of the Holy Ghost, in the room of the late marquis *de Breteuil*, and to the comptroller-general *Orri* that of great treasurer of the same order, which was possessed by the count *de Maurepas*, who has given his dismissal from his own free motive, reserving however the honours and prerogatives annexed to that dignity.

After having written thus far, I was informed from a good hand, that it was true the king had given the two abbies before-mentioned to the nephews of the late cardinal; but that they had besought his majesty not to take it amiss that they did not accept them, adding, that as each of them had already about 30,000 livres a-year in benefices, and that the example of the moderation of their late uncle had made such a strong impression on their hearts, that they ceased not to pray to God to give them the grace to imitate him, and that the king had received the request of these two abbots with much esteem and great marks of tenderness.

The canton of *Schwitz* has given leave to the court of *Spain* to raise a regiment of four battallions, which is to be commanded by colonel *Redinger*. It is also said (but of this I cannot be certain) that the abbot and prince of *St. Gall* has likewise given permission to raise such another regiment of four battallions
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lieutenant-colonel *Dunant*, by birth a *Swiss*,
and who is already in the service of *Spain*.

Paris, Feb.
4, 1743.

I am yours, &c.

M. Van Hoey to M. Fagel.

S I R,

I BEGIN this dispatch, by rectifying an error that slipped into my former of the 1st instant, *viz.* that the *tontine* established here sometime ago was filled the same day it was opened, because I am informed in a manner which leaves me no room to doubt of the truth of it, that so late as yesterday one might have had tickets.

My author, a merchant at *Geneva*, spoke however very fairly; for having been informed by one of the collectors of the *tontine*, who, because he had sold all his own tickets, imagined that the rest of the collectors must have had the same good luck, on his credit reported it to me. However it is most certain, that money is by no means scarce here, nor the public credit at all sunk. One proof of this is, that money has not risen at all above its ordinary course, which is that of 5 *per cent.* and that the actions are actually higher now than they were at the beginning of this war.

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I was in another error in my enumeration of the revenues of the late cardinal; for I find that, instead of 20,000 livres that I said he received as superintendant of the posts he had but 15,000.

The great example of the king, and the proneness of envy to fly at living game is the reason that almost every body here does strict justice to the memory of this great minister, and regret his loss as it deserves.

The estate of the celebrated cardinal *George d'Amboise*, prime minister to *Lewis XII.* amounted to 11,000,000 livres, and the mark of silver was then worth but 10 livres, whereas it is now worth 50.

The revenues of cardinal *Richlieu* were prodigiously great, and his succession much surpassed the riches of the most opulent private person, in his time, throughout all *Europe*.

Cardinal *Mazarin* enjoyed a revenue of 1,800,000 francs, his succession was worth 22,000,000, and the mark of silver was then no higher than 27 livres.

In comparing the credit these first ministers had then with their master, with the intire and perfect confidence which the present king reposed in his late eminency, we find, that the power of the former was as much below the all powerful credit of the latter, as their riches were above those which he posselt.

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That example of singular moderation given by the two nephews of the late cardinal, is not generally applauded, which ought not however to surprize us, because, as you know, Sir, men do not care to see in others, virtues of which they know themselves incapable, and endeavour always to stigmatize them with the name of some vice, or else to turn them into ridicule ; but persons of candour, and all such as know these young gentlemen throughly, cannot forbear rendering justice to the uprightness of their hearts.

The comptroller general was appointed executor of the will of his late eminency, and under him the abbot *de Brisjac*, who transacted the affairs of the late cardinal. This choice proves the unshaken confidence of that minister, in the comptroller, on the foot on which I have always spoken of it in my relations, in opposition to so many reports to the contrary, destitute of all foundation, and which were nevertheless scattered on all sides.

This last mentioned person is universally looked upon as having a large share in the king's confidence apparently, because he is generally thought worthy of it ; and I have already observed, more than once, the sincere and constant desire that this minister has to contribute to the utmost of his power, to the strengthening the friendship between
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this crown and the republic, and the persuasion he has, that nothing can be more advantageous to both nations. One may certainly reckon upon his word, since he is one of those men who speak always from the bottom of their hearts, and whose actions are so many invariable proofs that uprightness is the highest point of their policy.

In the conversation I had on *Tuesday* and *Wednesday* with M. *Amelot*, and some other ministers of this court, I have remarked, Sir,

- I. The same sentiments for confirming the good intelligence, and for the same reason that I have just mentioned, and which I have often informed their high mightinesses, was the genuine way of thinking of this court, as well as of this whole nation.
- II. The same subjects for my apprehensions mentioned in my last, at the paragraph which begins, *but I should be in the wrong to conceal from their high mightinesses, &c.* And as the cause of apprehensions, as well as their remedy, are to be there found, I shall not enter further into that matter.

I shall only add the three following maxims, because they express in very few words very essential points, which they placed before my eyes in this last conversation, as well

well as in others preceding it, with regard to the confirmation of the reciprocal amity between the two nations :

Viz. 1. That how sincere soever our affections may be for others, we are not the masters of their conduct. 2. That friendship should not flow from one side only ; and, 3. That as friendship begets friendship, hatred begets hatred.

In this conversation it appeared to me afresh, that all the ministers think still as they thought before, and as they have always thought in respect to the establishment for the repose of *Europe* ; and that each of them is particularly persuaded, that a proposition on the part of the state upon the foot of the *uti possidetis*, would be conformable to reason, and all that can be most glorious and most useful for the republic, and the true means for bringing back peace for the common good of *Europe*, and consequently for discharging the state from those extraordinary armaments in which the lighting up of the present war engaged them ; and so that no power in *Europe* can take ill this mediation of the regency of the republic, because that their good faith and their fidelity to their engagements, as well as their love for peace, will all be set by this means in the fairest light ; and it will appear, by the strongest evidence, that this is the surest method of procuring the welfare of all the

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parties in general, and of each of them in particular.

M. Amelot communicated to me, in the same conversation, the declaration made by the king of *Prussia* to the king of *Great-Britain* and to the *States-General*; and this court seems to me well contented with this step of his *Prussian* majesty.

Many of our politicians, in their own opinions, accustomed, as you are sensible, Sir, to assign very idly mysterious causes to very simple events, imagined fully and firmly that this measure was taken in concert with this court, and that *France* being slighted by the republic, had, if I may so speak, thrown herself into the arms of the king of *Prussia*, in order to obtain a peace by his means.

But the two following reasons seem to me to demonstrate that the declaration of that king was as little concerted with this court, as with the king of *Great-Britain* or with the *States*.

I. Because the rupture of that friendship which subsisted between this court and that of *Prussia*, is too fresh to believe it natural, that the first of these courts should give the last so great a mark of confidence.

II. Because in the last conversation it still appears to me, that this court wishes no less to see itself indebted for peace to the republic, than it wishes for peace itself.

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Their high mightinesses therefore will permit me, because the thing comes in here a propos, to put them in mind of the convincing reasons, by which it appears that this court cannot declare its intentions for a peace, in a more public manner.

These reasons may be found in many of my former, and amongst others that of the 31st of last *December*, at the place which begins with these words, *in the first place, that this court has given it sufficiently to be understood, &c.* they will likewise permit me at the same time to refresh their memory, as to the several reasonings in the same relation, which sensible people regard here as demonstrative for the conviction of any reasonable and impartial man, that none of the powers in war, can by any means, humanly speaking, render their conditions better by the continuation of this war.

The design of M. *Bellisle* was to arrive at *Francfort* the 31st of last month, and to be here by the end of this.

It is generally reported, and in such a manner, that we can no longer doubt the truth of it, that the emperor's discontent towards M. *Broglie* is much increased, so that his imperial majesty insists in the most pressing manner, upon his recall and demands at the same time, that the command

of the *French* troops in *Bavaria*, should be given to marshal *Bellisle*.

We are no less positively told, that *M. Broglie* himself demands his recall with as great warmth, and that as a good and faithful subject he alledges, that he cannot resolve to attempt impossibilities to please a foreign prince, and this at the expence of the blood of the king's soldiers, and consequently to the prejudice of his service. You will easily judge, Sir, that this brave general by writing in this style, does not make his court much to the hot heads here.

The ambassador of *Venice* tells me the son of the chevalier *Trono*, a young lord of about thirty-one, has been named by the republic ambassador extraordinary to the states, and that he has accepted it.

They talk of a numerous promotion of generals, that the king is speedily to make in order to recompence the officers of the armies in *Bohemia* and *Bavaria*.

I am

Paris, Feb.
8, 1743.

Yours, &c.

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M. *Van Hoey* to M. *Fagel*.

S I R,

THE declaration of the king of *Prussia* to the states, and to the king of *Great-Britain*, makes at present the principal subject of publick discourse, and I shall have much ado to express the more than ordinary esteem which this prince has acquired among the *French* nation, by this magnanimous measure. For these are the terms of which they speak of it here, because it is generally understood, that it must of necessity operate towards the re-establishment of a peace, which, you know Sir, they most ardently desire here.

The reasons which induce us to expect with so much certainty, this salutary effect from this declaration, are these that follow :

In the first place, because hereby there is absolutely taken from the queen of *Hungary* all hope of rendering her condition better by the war.

II. Because the good faith of *England* and the republic, with respect to their defensive engagements with the house of *Austria* prove to a demonstration, the impossibility there is, that the emperor should ever carry into execution any of his pretensions on the succession
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of the late emperor *Charles VI.* even supposing that *France* would assist his imperial majesty in the prosecution of his design, with all her forces.

With respect to this last reason, I find myself obliged to repeat what I have already said so often, that this court wishes most sincerely, that we would prevent all grounds of distrust and enmity between this nation and ours, not only because (which is very natural) this nation is far enough from desiring to draw upon her new enemies, but principally because a rupture between this nation and ours, is universally considered, as a thing altogether unnatural, and the most pernicious that can be for both states.

It seems to me also far from being unseasonable to repeat once again what I have so often said, *viz.* That I do not perceive this court looks upon it as at all contrary to the amity subsisting between his majesty and the republic, that the latter employs her treasures in virtue of a defensive alliance to enable the queen of *Hungary* to preserve her hereditary countries.

We are assured that 8 or 10,000 *Austrian* troops are in full march to reinforce those under the command of count *Traun* in *Italy*.

We are likewise assured, that the court of *Vienna*, and that of *England*, have fixed upon

upon a certain recompence for his *Sardinian* majesty, in consideration of his faithful assistance in defending the dominions of the house of *Austria*, at the expence of his duchy of *Savoy*, and exposing his person to the greatest dangers.

This being so, it is reckoned here, that the dominions of the queen in *Italy* are now in perfect security, because the king of *Sardinia* may employ all his troops, and thereby render the passage from *Savoy* into *Piedmont*, absolutely impracticable to don *Philip*. This monarch finding himself much encouraged to undertake this, and the *Austrian* army under count *Traun*, being by this time superior in force to that of the *Spaniards* under general *de Gages*.

As the king of *France* has begun to govern by himself, I think it my duty to give their high mightinesses a slight sketch of his character, founded on the constant, faithful and unanimous reports of such as have the honour to approach nearest his royal person.

This prince is naturally just, debonair, discreet, and impenetrably secret; pious, but above human weaknesses, preferring repose and the pleasures of life, to laborious occupations; of a sound judgment, and a happy memory, well enough versed in history, especially that of his own kingdom; not born with any passion for war, but rather
of

of a peaceable disposition ; he has a high spirit, has much sensibility in friendship, and does not very patiently bear being ill treated, or ill thought of.

This picture, which is as like as possible, will, as well as the rest of my accounts, verify itself to their high mightinesses upon all occasions.

Having this opportunity, let me have leave to observe, of what consequence at all times, the first impressions of friendship or enmity are, at the beginning of a new administration, as this seems to be at present, and I should act extremely wrong in concealing from your high mightinesses, that it appears to me, that they daily count less and less on the friendship of our nation.

The report here is strong, that if the enemies of *France* should succeed in rendering the war general, which is what they have been aiming at a long time, the king will, in that case, put himself at the head of his army, on that side, where action is likely to be warmest, and this, in all probability, will be in the *Austrian Netherlands*.

In the mean time this court neglects nothing which may prevent so pernicious an evil, or which may enable them to resist it in case it should prove inevitable.

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	Men.
The infantry of this kingdom } before the war consisted of }	120,000
Augmentation of ten men to } a company - - - }	30,000
The militia of <i>Lorrain</i> -	4,000
Foreign regiments augmented	8,000
Total	162,000

The cavalry before the war was	20,000
Augmentation of ten men to a } troop - - - }	10,000
Three hundred new-raised } troops - - - }	11,000
Total	41,000

The whole forces of <i>France</i>	203,000
To which we must add of } invalids now serving in }	16,000
garrisons - - - -	
Total	219,000

I have read and read again with the utmost attention the resolution of their high mightinesses of the 22d of last month, taken upon a relation of mine of the 18th, and yet I have not been able to discover the passages that have had the misfortune to dis-

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please

please their high mightinesses to such a degree as that they should find reflections *a little indecent, not only on the conduct of the allies of the state, but also on the conduct and deliberations of the state itself.*

I am much for that rule which says, *antequam incipias, consulto; postquam consulueris mature, facto opus est.* A resolution once taken by the sovereign is a sacred law, for its subjects and every one ought thereto to conform his actions; but I also believe, that while the sovereign deliberates, it ought to be free for all who have any lawful vocation to speak their sentiments according to their lights upon every thing that has a near relation to the service of the state. To do one's best in such a case, without suffering one's self to be diverted by considerations either of favour or prejudice, has been always and with good reason held one of the most essential duties of a member of the high regency; and the currency of this great maxim in a state constantly regarded as the happiest effect, the most evident proof, and the surest support of our most precious liberty.

I have not hitherto had any advice or information of the deliberations of their high mightinesses, neither directly nor through the canal of any of those who have a share in them; so that I really know nothing but what I am told by the ministers here. They may see by my dispatch of the 14th of *January,*

nuary, and those that follow it, that by all that through this canal comes to my knowledge of their deliberations, I ought necessarily to conclude, they have for their object either their preserving peace, or their taking part of the war. In this situation I had a right to make use of all the informations which to me appeared capable of inclining the clear judgment of their high mightinesses to prefer peace to the calamity of war; and the strengthening and confirming the amity of this crown, so as to render the course thereof everlasting, was so agreeable to the great objects of my embassy, to the religion of our supreme regency, to their love for peace, to nature, reason, and to all that is most glorious and useful for the state, that I certainly should have looked upon myself as the most culpable of men, if I had been wanting thereto in any manner whatsoever. I may possibly deceive myself; God alone is infallible: but my duty obliges me to inform the state of all that comes to my knowledge, which had any reference to deliberations of so great importance.

Their high mightinesses will have the goodness to recollect, that all my dispatches for a considerable time past, but especially since the 14th of last month to this that I am now writing inclusively, have had no other view than absolutely to acquaint them

with advices that seemed to me proper fully to prove the five or six points that follow :

- I. That, humanly speaking, the good offices employed by their high mightinesses for the re-establishment of the peace of *Europe* on the foot of the *uti possidetis*, will naturally produce this salutary effect.
- II. That in case the queen of *Hungary* should accept such an offer, and on the contrary the emperor and his allies should refuse it, the succours which the republic should, through her fidelity to treaties, grant the said queen for the defence of her hereditary countries, would be fully justified even at this court.
- III. That the aid and assistance of the republic for the carrying on an offensive war against the emperor, or against *France*, will be, and must be always regarded here on the foot of a war, unnecessary, unjust, and, however it may end, pernicious to the republic, because the amity of this crown will be changed into the most violent enmity, and its present sentiments of high esteem will be entirely overturned.
- IV. That according to the rule, *vulnera non infliguntur ad mensuram*, stripes are not laid on by measure ; the republic, after the first step of hostility against

against this crown, will find herself pushed every day, whether she will or not, to take a greater and greater share in a most ruinous war.

V. That an offensive war between the queen and the emperor, or against this crown, supposing that the republic should contribute thereto with all its forces, could not however, humanly speaking, render the situation of that princess better than it might be already by her accepting the *uti possidetis*, which might long ago have obtained, and may be yet obtained. Besides, that in sacrificing the resentment of her ulcerated heart to peace, and to the preservation of the lives and fortunes of her subjects and her allies, she would acquire, by the surest method in the world, the highest pitch of glory.

VI. In fine, as nature teaches us that menaces beget resentments, so all things that have that air, must necessarily at this court rather retard peace, than advance it, because the temper of the monarch, the character of the nation, and the power of this crown, are all of them things intirely opposite to whatever resembles forcible methods, or means of constraint.

So that when their high mightinesses shall thoroughly examine all these reasons, with those that I have alledged to support them, and shall afterwards take the pains to compare them with the expressions I have made use of in setting them forth, and make them the object of their deliberations, I assure myself that they will find the importance of the before-mentioned point, much exceed the warmth of the words I have used, how strong so ever they might seem.

You know, Sir, that it is in a proposition simple clear and that contains some important truth, in which consists the truth of that which alone merits the name of *sublime*; and I dare assert, that instead of endeavouring to exaggerate truth by studied and forced expressions, I rather believe that my words have detracted from the force of truth, how strong and weighty soever they might be.

Their high mightinesses will also have the goodness to add, that I could, with the greatest knowledge of the cause, and consequently on the best foundation possible, give them lights on all the before-mention'd points; lights drawn from the real mode of thinking at this court, and the true state in which the affairs of this kingdom stand, it not being possible to question that through the space of so long an embassy as I have had the honour to pass in this court, experience

has

has given me a superior and more perfect knowledge as to both these points.

I am, &c.

Paris, April 11,
1743.

M. Van Hoey to M. Fagel.

S I R,

I Had occasion on *Monday* and *Tuesday* last to see M. *Amelot*, and the rest of the ministers of his most christian majesty, and in the conversations I had with them, it appears to me that this court reckons no longer on the friendship of this state at all, nor has any further notion of its constant love of peace. They argued with me very coldly on the subject of the deliberations of the republic, and as if they were things the most indifferent in the world to this crown; for said they to me, every one ought to know what he has to do; and one cannot, how ardently soever one may desire it, entertain friendship with those who are born our enemies, or with such as will lend them their ears, and suffer themselves to be disposed, if not all at once, yet by little and little, to become our enemies as much as those.

I have heartily endeavoured, (as I have done heretofore conformable to my instructions, and to the last order of their high

high mightinesses) to remove these sort of prejudices from the minds of the ministers; but the conversation upon this subject was dry and laconic. For when I would have entered upon the chapter of the profound respect, which the republic hath for the friendship of this crown, they answered me with a smile, that they firmly believed and sincerely wished, that things were so, but that I was greatly misinformed.

The expressions which I made use of in several of my former, particularly that of the 14th of *January* last, at the article which begins with these words, *I have often mentioned to their high mightinesses the general esteem, &c.* are not certainly in the least exaggerated, but rather too weak when I compare them with the grounds on which they were written, and these circumstances I use only to make the thing appear to their high mightinesses in the same light, with equal clearness, and exactly in the state in which they appear to me. The consequences which I have drawn from these universal sentiments of the *French* for the republic, whether she inclines to realize these sentiments, for the preservation of commerce and navigation, by continuing to live with them on the same foot of friendship, or if she should change this amity into the most violent hatred against our nation, by destroying the confidence this
court

court places in the republic ; these consequences, I say, are too well founded in the nature of things themselves, for us not to see them verified by the event.

In my last and most respectful I spake (in the passage which begins 6th *and lastly*, *As nature*, &c.) of an apprehension which appears to me to be too well founded. So that I am really afraid, that the appearance of an armed mediation on the part of the state, would postpone the affair of the pacification, instead of advancing it, and I more and more dread, that the event should make it too evident how well my fears are grounded.

For you must be sensible, Sir, how far enterprizing people are skilled in the art of disguising their notions, under the appearance of greatness of soul, and thereby prevailing over human abilities, and especially over those of a king, who feels himself young and powerful, and has an high and haughty spirit, so as to make themselves masters of his heart, and how facile it would then be for such ambitious persons to make all prudence and moderation pass for shameful and despicable weakness.

M. de *Chauvelin* has found a way to heighten that disgrace, which he had reason to expect after the death of the cardinal, by a letter that he wrote to the king on the 4th or 5th of this month, to desire

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to

to be called from his exile. This letter was accompanied with a memorial, drawn as if it had been written, when he was at *Gros Bois* in order to prove, that the cardinal was but a weak man, and to point out the means of putting the affairs of the kingdom on a foot, which according to the author's notions, would best agree with the glory of the king, and the felicity of the people. This memoir provoked the king to such a degree, that he took a resolution of causing him to be shut up for ever in one of the worst prisons of the kingdom; but all the ministers having interceded with his majesty, though they are far from having any friendship for the person of this exile, they found means to soften the king, who is naturally good, and of a gentle disposition, so that their intercession hath prevailed.

The king applies himself, and with the best grace in the world, to the administrators of his affairs, and makes it evident upon every occasion, that he has a very quick and lively genius, so that it is more than ever believed, that if hitherto the pleasures of life, have a little diverted him from business, it was solely the effect of that entire confidence, with which he honoured his prime minister M. the cardinal; and not at all from an indolent disposition, which has been very falsely reported to be natural to him.

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The satisfaction the whole nation feels from this is extreme, and the ministers never neglect any occasion of letting the king know it, who on his side testifies a joy, which is certainly not all inferior to it; so that it appears, the praises they bestow upon his virtues, produce in this monarch those happy effects, which are accustomed to spring in virtuous hearts and true heroes, that it is to say, in men born for virtue, and who the more they are acquainted with it, cherish it the more.

All the generals and most experienced officers agree, that if the war becomes general, which they suppose will be the case as soon as their high mightinesses shall permit a part of their troops, to act in an offensive war against the emperor, this crown will have no other part to take than to transfer the scene of war, into the *Austrian Netherlands*, by the siege of some important place, and they likewise agree that a powerful diversion made by this crown, in favour of the emperor, would be the only means of preventing the ruin of that prince, and to preserve him from being overwhelmed by the superiority of his enemies.

This sort of reasoning prevails the more here, since it is a long time that they have been generally weary of continuing so ruinous a war in countries, at so great a distance.

I ought also to add, that little and great, and in short the whole nation judge, that *France* neither can, nor ought, at any rate, to suffer that the house of *Austria* should should aggrandize it self by the acquisition of the dominions of *Bavaria*, or that it should succeed in placing the grand duke on the imperial throne, by force of arms.

I am

Paris, Feb.
15. 1743.

Yours, &c.

M. *Van Hoey* to M. *Fagel*.

S I R,

IT appears to me absolutely necessary for the service of the republic, that I should report two little accidents, by which we may judge of the character of the king, and which serve to shew the likeness of the portrait which I lately drew of him, for the service of their high mightinesses.

The first was this, The king having resolved to make the late keeper of the seals M. *de Chauvelin* feel the weight of his indignation, he at the same time caused it to be signified to his family, that this disgrace no way respected them, that faults and punishments being intirely personal, they might rest assured, that they should have a part in his favours, as well as his other subjects,

jects, provided they shewed themselves worthy of them, by meriting well of the public.

The second fell out thus. The dauphin having shewn a great deal of joy at the list of benefices being given to his preceptor the antient bishop of *Mirepoix*, the king said, that he was very well satisfied with the pleasure testified by his son, because it was the mark of an upright heart, and that himself had always considered such sentiments as one of the greatest of virtues, because it springs from the true love of our neighbour.

The surprize of the public becomes every day greater and greater, in proportion as the news is spread by the gazettes, or otherwise, of the disposition, in which the republic finds itself, of taking part in the war, in order to force the emperor and his allies to a peace on terms agreeable to the queen of *Hungary*.

But this ought not to appear astonishing, because, as I have often before observed, they attributed to their high mightinesses sentiments directly opposite to all enmity, or acting in any manner against this crown; and I perceive more and more, that I gave a right character of this nation, when I laid it down, that gentleness and amity supported by a prudent conduct, may easily obtain from them whatever appears just, and that a
vain

vain display of forcible methods serves to no other purpose, than to change the most favourable disposition, and the most cordial amity, into the most violent hatred. For besides that human nature generally revolts against whatever hath an air of threatening; one may farther say, that this nation makes the welfare of the kingdom consist in the glory of its king, and by a very natural kind of motion, this manner of thinking and of acting, is become, in time, the proper character of every individual.

I had occasion to see M. the prince de *Grimbergen*, minister plenipotentiary from the emperor, and as I always feel in my heart a warm sense of that truth which I have so often mentioned to the republic, that is to say, that the powers at war might very easily strike greater strokes than they do, if any of them apprehended, that thereby they should make their conditions better; therefore, as a true friend to each party in particular, and to mankind in general, I lose no opportunity of inculcating that inviolable truth, *viz.* that peace is of all other the greatest blessing to all states, and war the most destructive of all evils.

You know, Sir, that when we have strong passions to combat, experience shews us the truth of this reflection, *obsequium amicos, veritas odium*, i. e. *complaisance begets friends, and truth hate.* But I don't lose my courage
for

for all that; for having nothing more in view than the good of others, the more the consequences of the war are felt, the more my sincerity and the truth of my reflections will be discovered, and draw more and more the esteem and friendship of every one towards their author.

The prince of *Grimbergen* appear'd to me, in this conversation, much warmer than heretofore, and I should be in the wrong to dissemble, that the more I reflect on the fermentation of this nation, on the character of the king, and on the flattery that surrounds the throne, here as well as elsewhere, the more I apprehend that the queen of *Hungary* will never find her self so much at liberty as she is at present, to accept or to refuse propositions wherein due respect is had to her arch-ducal house, only to avoid offending a third power, to which I should add many other reflections, if I was not hindered by the resolution of their high mightinesses of the 15th and 22d of *January*; and I must confess, that the fear of displeasing them on one side, and on the other my zeal for the discharge of my duty, in communicating to them the reports and lights, which in this great crisis of affairs seem to me to be of the last importance, have thrown me into the greatest embarrassment. I am

Paris, Feb.
13, 1743.

Yours, &c.

M.

M. *Van Hoey*, Embassador from
their High Mightinesses, to M.
Fagel their Secretary,

S I R,

ON *Wednesday* last, I had the honour of
seeing the cardinal at *Marli*, who in
the course of conversation informed me, that
the marquis de *Fenelon* had sent his court ano-
ther resolution of their high mightinesses, ta-
ken in concert with his *Britannic* majesty, on
the subject of the instances made by the
queen of *Bohemia*, for obtaining succours. He
told me, that he look'd upon this last reso-
lution to be very conformable to that of which
I had given him an account a few days be-
fore ; and that, according to his intelligence,
he did not doubt but their high mightines-
ses would very speedily take a third resolu-
tion on the same subject. I answered, that
the resolution which the marquis de *Fenelon*
had sent, was that of which I had informed
his eminency before ; and that according to
what I had heard since, the reason why it
followed so quick on the communication I
had made in confidence of the subject of
the frequent conferences held with Mr. *Tre-
vor*, was in all appearance because the deli-
beration of their high mightinesses had been
pushed to a conclusion sooner than could
have

have been foreseen ; and that as to the rest, I had no notice whatsoever of a third resolution concerning that matter.

After this I endeavoured to discover what was to be expected from the pacific temper of this court for extinguishing the fire of war which had blazed out so violent in *Silesia*. But his eminency did not give me a direct answer ; he only repeated his former complaint on the motions made by *England* for raising up enemies against the crown of *France*, and forming a powerful league against her, which obliged *France* to think only of her proper defence and security, and consequently hindered her from meddling with the affairs of others. There want not some persons here, who endeavour to make the court apprehend that the *English* have thoroughly succeeded in their design of inspiring several powers, first, with jealousy, and by degrees with hatred and aversion towards her ; and that the true design of *England* is to draw over to her the king of *Prussia* at any rate whatever. Whence they deduce this conclusion, that it is the interest of *France* to manage that prince, and not to put an end immediately to foreign troubles, because while this evil disposition with regard to *France* continues so general, there is nothing can so effectually secure her repose, as divisions subsisting between other powers.

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They are extremely embarrassed here on the account of the *Spanish America*, because they now see clearly that *France* and *Spain* united, cannot long support themselves against the superior forces of *England*; and because it is certain, that looking, as they do, on the conquest of *America* by *England* as an inestimable loss to *France*, there is nothing they will not attempt in order to hinder so great a mischief.

In fine, I am still more and more of opinion, that the safety of *Europe* depends solely on *England's* taking some real step for re-establishing its friendship with *France*; and I am likewise strongly persuaded, that the consequences of that step would be altogether as happy as I have had the honour to predict more than once. But there is no time to be lost, because while opposite measures are taken on both sides, it is impossible that things should remain in the same situation, and that a rupture should not ensue.

I spoke also to the cardinal of the resolution of the 12th of *April*, of the subject of the difference of *Denmark*, and he answer'd me, that not only on this occasion, but also in all others that should offer themselves, his court would shew how truly it has the tranquillity of the republic at heart.

The marquis d'*Antin* is gone off by a natural death; so that the report spread of his
being

being mortally wounded in a duel, appears to be altogether void of foundation.

I am, &c.

Paris, May 5,

1741.

Instructions from their High Mightinesses, sent to M. Van Hoey, their Ambassador at Paris.

S I R,

AS we happen to have a copy of a secret resolution taken by the states-general on the propositions of neutrality that the cardinal and Mr. *Amelot* have made to M. *Van Hoey* ambassador of their high mightinesses, and on the discourses those two ministers have had with him in regard to the disposition in which *Holland* is said to be of entering into a war against *France*, the contents are here given word for word. It is remarkable that the word *neutrality* is not declined, but on the contrary it will be found to be tacitly rejected throughout, where they speak of the observations of their engagements in general, and in particular of their defensive alliances; and above all, by the protestation with which they conclude, saying, that their high mightinesses are resolved to contribute to the maintaining their alliance, peace, and friendship

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with

with *France*, as far as the thing shall be practicable. The resolution is of the 19th instant, and here follows what their high mightinesses have ordered M. *Van Hoey* their ambassador to give for answer.

“ That their high mightinesses have learned with extreme surprize, by his letter of the 29th of *November*, that they seem to be persuaded in *France*, that their high mightinesses are disposed to enter into a general war against that crown: that they are extremely well satisfied with the efforts he hath made to destroy an opinion at once so universal and so ill-founded: that they charge him to continue his cares to this effect, directing him not to fail of assuring, that their high mightinesses are infinitely far from having any such dispositions; and that they cannot conceive what could have occasioned such a suspicion, being well assured that their conduct could not have given any subject to it: that they think it is notorious to all the world, that they desire nothing more than the continuance of tranquillity and peace, and that they are so far from desiring in any degree to break it, that they wish with all their hearts, not only to be able to preserve it, but also to re-establish it where-ever it is troubled.

“ That content with their establishment, and desiring no sort of aggrandisement, they

“ they conceive their true interest to consist
 “ in the preservation of the peace and repose
 “ which they enjoy, and in the quiet pos-
 “ session of their estates and countries.

“ That to this end they have always made
 “ it their great care, to observe most religi-
 “ ously the treaties and engagements they
 “ have contracted with his most christian
 “ majesty, and, continuing still in the same
 “ sentiments, they cannot but commend
 “ the like dispositions which they have found
 “ in *France*, dispositions which they hope
 “ they shall equally find for the future.

“ That seeking without intermission reli-
 “ giously to fulfil their engagements, and
 “ not having contracted any which have a
 “ tendency to offend any power whatsoever,
 “ but having only made defensive alliances,
 “ they presume generally, that the powers
 “ with which they have contracted them
 “ are in the like disposition, and in particu-
 “ lar they rely, as they have hitherto always
 “ done on the treaties they jointly made with
 “ *Great Britain* and *France* in the year
 “ 1717, and they expect and count as on a
 “ thing certain, that as on their side they
 “ will exactly abide by the terms of those
 “ defensive alliances, so, in case any thing
 “ should happen whereby they should be o-
 “ bliged to claim under that treaty, they
 “ should obtain on the part of *France* the
 “ entire

entire and necessary execution for their
defence and security.

That as the rectitude of their sentiments
is far from the dispositions that have false-
ly been attributed to them, so they can
see nothing in any steps by them taken
which could furnish matter for calling in
question the sincerity of their intentions.

That it is true that sometime since they
augmented their troops, but that neither
these augmentations, nor any that they
may hereafter think fit to make, ought
to give any body the least umbrage, and
much less to *France*, as having solely for
their object their own security.

That tho' the actual troubles which
subsist do not directly regard the republic,
however, as the war is kindled in several
places, and that even their frontiers are
invested by great numbers of troops of
different powers, it ought not to seem
strange, that for this reason their high
mightinesses should think themselves ob-
liged to have the greater care of the
repose of their subjects, and to watch with
greater exactness over the security of their
country, than they are wont to do in times
of tranquillity and peace.

That besides, they have neither inter-
fered, nor have they any intention so to
do in things which they are not obliged
to meddle with by their engagements.

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“ For tho’ the election of a king of the *Ro-*
 “ *mans*, or of an emperor, is not an affair
 “ which the states can look upon with in-
 “ difference on account of their neighbour-
 “ hood, and from other motives; however
 “ they do not meddle therein, either direct-
 “ ly or indirectly, nor have they any inten-
 “ tion of meddling with it: but will leave
 “ the empire to do therein as they think fit,
 “ as in a thing which belongs properly to
 “ them; hoping that the election will fall
 “ upon a prince whose government will not
 “ only be the greatest blessing to the empire,
 “ but who will be likewise inclined to main-
 “ tain and cultivate peace, friendship, and
 “ good neighbourhood with the countries
 “ on his frontiers, and in particular with
 “ their high mightinesses.

“ That it is very true, that the assembling
 “ great bodies of troops near their frontiers,
 “ has given a great deal of inquietude to
 “ their high mightinesses; but that they
 “ have entirely confided in the agreeable
 “ assurances given them by the *marquis de*
 “ *Fenelon*, ambassador of *France*, who de-
 “ clared to them, that the march of those
 “ troops was not intended against the domi-
 “ nions or countries belonging to the repub-
 “ lic, nor even against their neighbours,
 “ comprehending principally under that ex-
 “ pression the inhabitants of the *Austrian*
 “ *Netherlands*, with whom they have so
 “ strict

“ strict a union. So that in this confidence
 “ they persisted, in the belief of these assur-
 “ ances being in effect realized by his most
 “ christian majesty, and still subsisting in
 “ their full force.

“ That the ambassador *Van Hoey* ought
 “ farther to give general assurances, that the
 “ wishes and sincere intentions of their high
 “ mightinesses are, that the peace, amity,
 “ and alliance between his majesty and them
 “ may last long and for ever. That on
 “ their side they are resolved to contribute
 “ thereto as the thing shall be practicable,
 “ and they hope the like from his most chri-
 “ stian majesty, that he will continue to
 “ have the same affection for the republic,
 “ and that he will not suspect any more
 “ things absolutely contrary to their inten-
 “ tions, their conduct having never been
 “ such as ought in any degree to render
 “ them suspected”.

This Instruction was dated,
December 30, 1741.

Answer

Answer of Cardinal *de Fleury*, to
a Letter of M. *Van Hoey*'s, the
one and the other relating to the
Resolution of the States-General,
of the 19th of *December* 1741.

I Return, Sir, a thousand most humble
thanks to your excellency for the ho-
nour you have done me, in communicating
to me the deliberation of the states-general,
of the 19th of last month. I have too
much confidence in their high mightinesses,
to doubt the assurances they give, that
the augmentation of their troops does not
regard *France* in any degree, and that the
republic always intends to maintain a strict
and constant union with the king. Your
excellency can better than any other testify
my sentiments, which will never change,
because I believe them founded on the com-
mon interest and on justice. It does not
become me to decide whether the third aug-
mentation was fit or not, and if it was ne-
cessary for the security of the republick.
I shall only say, without fear of being con-
tradicted, that we wish the tranquillity of
the republic, at least, as well as the best of
their own citizens, and I will add with al-
most the same assurance a certain neigh-
bouring

bouring prince, of whose enterprizes they seem to be most afraid, has not any view or design of disquieting the republic: after this she is the mistress to judge what is fittest for her. But as I interest myself in all things, that may advantage her, I must say, that I don't know whether so great a augmentation, may not render her intentions less favourably thought of, or that they will not engage other powers to augment their troops. It does not belong to me to carry my conjectures farther, but I heartily wish and with great sincerity, that the alarm which with so much pains hath been spread not only amongst the governors of the republic, but also through the people, may not have more troublesome consequences that can be apprehended. I beseech your excellency to be perswaded of all the sentiments of confidence and cordiality, with which I profess myself to honour you.

Versailles, Jan. The Cardinal DE FLEURY.
18, 1742.

Answer of the Cardinal *de Fleury*,
to M. *Van Hoey*.

I Give you, Sir, a thousand thanks for communicating to me the dispositions in which your excellency believes the republic

public to be at present ; and it shall not certainly be any fault of mine, that they do not become better even than you represent them.

I am going to answer some points which seem to give you pain, and which it will not be difficult for me to do.

- I. The king of *England* seems to have an intention of preserving the neutrality stipulated last year for his *Hanoverian* dominions, and we shall consent to it without pain, if his *Britannick* majesty will engage himself to take certain necessary precautions in case *England* should come to declare against us. The answer cannot wait long ; and in case we succeed, I make no doubt that the king will consent to withdraw his troops out of the neighbourhood of the republic. It will not be even impossible that we shall speedily begin with the withdrawing some batallions ; and in the mean time I can, in the name of the king my master, give you the most solemn assurances in order to calm all the suspicions that the states may have conceived. The public news speaks of the augmentation of the *Hanoverian* troops. I am not assured of this, but it will be easy for that prince to remove this subject of inquietude.

II. It is absolutely false that the king intends to strengthen his army on the *Lower Rhine*; and there neither is nor will be any question of sending there so much as a batallion more.

III. If the seven provinces unite in the negotiation of a neutrality with us, the marquis *de Fenelon* ought already to have declared to the states that the king will yield to it with pleasure, and will give, without exception, all the security that they can demand.

IV. Your excellency knows better than any body, that I never looked upon the augmentation of the troops of the republic, as a thing which we had any right to oppose; and if I have sometimes testified to you that it gave us some pain, it was only as to the consequences we apprehended some warm members might draw from it, to the prejudice of the republic. Your excellency has long known my sentiments on this article, and they still remain the same as they were.

It is true, that I do not desire to see any person in my retreat, that I may labour there the more quietly; but your excellency will be always master of my time, when ever you will do me the honour to come.

come. You know how long, and to how great a degree I profess, &c.

The Cardinal DE FLEURY.

Iffy, Febr. 21,
1742.

*Letter from Cardinal de Fleury to
the Ambassador Van Hoey.*

S I R,

I Learn with great concern, by the letter with which your excellency honoured me yesterday, that you have a very great cold ; I hope, Sir, that it will not be attended with any ill consequences.

I give you a thousand thanks for the deliberation of the states-general, though I had already received it from the marquis *de Fénélon*. I acknowledge, with great satisfaction, the continuation of the sentiments of the republic, and her constant resolution to maintain the ancient and strict amity between *France* and her. I can assure your excellency that the king is no less disposed to preserve it ; and most certainly his majesty will never do it the slightest injury. You know, Sir, that he has offered to take mutually the strongest security for preventing this harmony from being ever troubled ; and your excellency may be satisfied, that our army on the *Lower Rhine* was never de-
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stined directly nor indirectly to give umbrage or inquietude to your frontiers. The season will not permit them at present to quit their quarters ; but as soon as we are satisfied that mutual tranquillity will be preserved in that neighbourhood, the king will not hesitate an instant in giving your masters all the satisfaction they can desire. It were to be wished that confidence was so well established, that there might be no need to take precautions on any side : and his majesty has so formally and so precisely explained himself on all the securities that can possibly be demanded for the countries in the neighbourhood of the republic, that this assurance is as solemn as if the king had bound himself thereto by a formal treaty.

Your excellency is more in a condition to render testimony, as to the sincerity of my sentiments, than any other person ; and I will endeavour never to belye the good opinion you are pleased to have of me. This I shall at least merit by the sincerity and particular consideration with which I honour your excellency.

The Cardinal DE FLEURY.

Iffy, April 1,
1742.

M.

M. *Van Hoey* to M. *Fagel*.

S I R,

I N the conversation I had on *Monday* and *Tuesday* last at *Versailles*, and at *Issy* with the cardinal and other ministers of the state, I found that the disposition of this court with regard to the present state of affairs, is the same which I have so often written to their high mightinesses ; and as they have always the same confidence in the wisdom, and firm attachment of the republic, to maintain their amity with this crown, and the same desire for establishing the public repose, wishing at the same time that *Europe* in general, and *France* in particular, may receive so great a blessing from the hands of the state.

It appears to me, that they wish here to be able to understand, from the close of the memorial of the baron *de Reishach*, which I mentioned in my letter of the 28th of *September* last, upon what conditions the court of *Vienna* inclines to make peace, and why she rather chuses to expose her dominions and her subjects to the greatest dangers, than to listen to such propositions. For it naturally appears to the court of *France*, that their high mightinesses should be perfectly informed as to the motives which engage the court of *Vienna* to continue the war, viz,
that

that in case the just defence of the hereditary dominions of the house *Austria* should appear to be now no more the true cause, the state may no longer continue to support the queen of *Hungary*, conformable to treaties, and be always obliged to furnish her contingent, and the court of *France*, expects that in case this defensive war, as it is called, should become offensive, on the part of the house of *Austria*, it should be no longer subsisted by the state, at the expence of her subjects, because it is certainly contrary to the interest of the republic to nourish and maintain such a war; and to go still farther, it no way agrees with the well known wisdom of their high mightinesses, which ought to make them always wish and desire a general peace. The ministers added that the duration of this war was not an affair indifferent to the republic, and that, tho' hitherto she had enjoyed by the grace of God, the inestimable blessing of peace, however she had not escaped feeling a very large expence, thro' the considerable augmentation of troops which this war made her resolve upon; so that her particular interest, as well as that which it becomes her to take in the prosperity and support of the common cause of *Europe*, which, without doubt, is that of peace, will appear to the republic two motives equally strong and pressing, to engage her endeavours to stop the rage and ravages of
war

war. Besides that, the gratitude, friendship, and high esteem which so many nations already have for the republic, there would still necessarily result two happy consequences for her, the security of maintaining the precious blessing of peace, and the being able to ease the burthens of her subjects.

They concern themselves here at present less than ever, as it appears to me, with respect to the menaces of the courts of *England* and *Vienna*, and that of *France* is less sensible of the hatred, the ambition, and the contempt with which she thinks she has been treated by those two courts, in a manner as whimsical as it is extraordinary. I hold myself farther obliged to report to their high mightinesses, that they lay great stress, build much, and press me strongly on the reasons contained in my most submissive dispatch of the 18th of *December*.

Upon the same occasion, the conversation happened to turn on the declaration of the empress of *Russia*, by which she has named the duke of *Holstein* her successor, and upon this occasion, I could very clearly remark, that they could have wished here, that the choice the states of *Sweeden* had made of the person of the duke for successor to the crown of that kingdom, had taken place, because it is now said, that the *English* will do their utmost to procure the election of prince *Frederick* of *Hesse-Cassel*, son in law to

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his *Britannic* majesty, the success of which election would be very far from being agreeable to the court of *France*, and would not be altogether indifferent to the other powers of *Europe*; as yet I do not perceive, that they give themselves here much pain about the exorbitant power, that must be produc'd by the union of the puissant empire of *Russia* with the kingdom of *Sweden*, in the person of the duke of *Holstein*, because it is clearly conceived, that such a union is absolutely impossible, from the nature of the thing; and that for the reasons that follow,

- I. Because that, in all ages, these two monarchies have been accustomed to be governed by their proper kings, residing in the heart of their dominions, so that neither of them will ever bear to see itself reduced to be governed by a viceroy.
- II. Nor is this project less affected by the antient hate and jealousy that has ever reigned between these two nations.
- III. And lastly, in case a union of this kind could be effected, it would endure but for a very short space of time, and would besides tend to the ruin of both kingdoms, because of its being forced, and contrary to nature, which would make it an absolute and perpetual cause of discord, and productive thereby of intestine war.

Several

Several ministers of this court, speaking to me on this subject, have alledged, that the same reasons demonstrate that this union of these two crowns is a chimera, and as little to be feared by one nation as by the other, and may therefore serve to demonstrate, in the very strongest terms, the ridiculousness of like apprehensions with respect to the crowns of *France* and *Spain*: which vain fears, however, not long ago caused an expensive, bloody, and lasting war, which was withal useless, and to no manner of purpose.

I had the satisfaction to find the cardinal much better than I have thought him for a long time.

Paris, Jan.
4. 1743.

I am yours, &c.

M. Van Hoey to M. Fagel.

S I R,

THE enrollments that are made here for the militia in this city cause great uneasiness among the common people, because it is done in an unusual manner, and every one is afraid on his own account; besides, they begin to doubt whether the number of 1800 men, which I informed you was the contingent of this city, will suffice, because it is believed, that besides the 30,000

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men of the militia, there must be still a much greater number to reinforce the *French* army in *Bavaria*, and that which is on its march from *Prague*.

In making a revision of the state of the troops that I communicated to your high mightinesses in my last most submissive letter, I find that of the infantry pretty exact, if we include in the 120,000 men, of which I made the infantry 2400 dismounted dragoons. But the number of the horse was not quite so right, for before the war they were 23,384, instead of 20,000, as I before computed them: this mistake happened by my forgetting the cavalry of the king's household, and the *gend' armée*.

I went on *Monday* last to *Versailles*, according to the custom, that of late I have taken up, finding myself cramped for time on a *Tuesday* in going, returning, and transacting affairs. I had there a private conversation with some lords, and one amongst the rest addressed himself to me in these words: "What? is it possible that the
 " states, at the expence of the lives and fortunes of their subjects, would gratify the
 " vengeance and thirst of power with which
 " another potentate burns?" I answered, that I knew nothing at all as yet of the deliberations of the state, but that it appeared to me that *France* had given it subject sufficient. Upon this, that lord said to me
 very

very obligingly, *Mr. ambassador*, he who contemplates himself in another, sees himself agreeably: afterwards he painted out to me the impossibility there is, humanly speaking, for the queen of *Hungary* to make any conquest on the emperor, or to take from him his crown; and on the other side, the like impossibility for the emperor to effect any thing against that princess; the whole to the very same purpose that I have so often written to the state. After all this he added, “ I am not at all surprized that the emperor and the queen of *Hungary* remain firm, from a notion that their hopes may be gratified sooner or later, how impossible soever the thing may be: for both suffer themselves to be carried away by their favourite passion, and as yet, reason however powerful, has ever been kept under. But that which surprizes me is, that there are powers to be found who will sacrifice their own proper security, their repose, and their well-being, to support these vain enterprizes, without being able to draw any real benefit from them, even if she should succeed in forcing either the court of *Vienna* or that of *France* to receive law from them.” My answer was, “ That for my part this did not surprize me at all in respect to the allies of the queen of *Hungary*, because the house of *Austria* had always endeavoured

“ to

“ to maintain the equilibrium of *Europe* a-
 “ gainst the efforts of *France*.” Upon this
 that lord replied, “ My God! is it possible
 “ that people should abuse terms at that
 “ rate? for I declare *bona fide*, that the sup-
 “ port of that equilibrium was the formal
 “ reason engaged *France* to support the em-
 “ peror in his pretensions on the succession
 “ of *Charles VI.* because we believe here,
 “ that this equilibrium would be entirely
 “ destroyed; above all with respect to the
 “ liberty and independency of the *German*
 “ empire, if the *Imperial* crown had been
 “ rendered hereditary in the female-line of
 “ the house of *Austria*, which will always
 “ continue to aggrandize itself by marriage,
 “ or otherwise, and add thereby new terri-
 “ tories to their already so far extended do-
 “ minions.” In fine, we speculated on
 sound policy in opposition to panic terrors,
 and those false precautions which are so often
 honoured, tho’ very *mal a propos*, with the
 specious name of prudence: upon this head
 he told me, he had always regarded the fol-
 lowing definition, as the most proper to cha-
 racterize a man justly intitled to the name of
 a true politician. “ He is, *said he*, one who
 “ is a man of probity, versed in history and
 “ law; but above all in the law of nations,
 “ understanding perfectly well the present
 “ state of affairs at home as well as abroad;
 “ and above all, acquainted with the hu-
 “ mour

“mour of different nations, and their manner of thinking.” He added, “that he had always found the happy success with which such a knowledge was followed, and which characterized such a politician who was,

I. To look only for himself in himself, and from thence to have less attention to what others do, or might do, than to what we are obliged to do ourselves, in order to secure our own happiness.

II. To consider peace as the greatest blessing for all countries and for all states, and war, on the contrary, as the greatest of all evils.

III. Never to esteem any thing useful or profitable, that is not at the same time just and honest.

IV. And lastly, never to desire to be happy, but on condition to render others happy; and above all, never to become so at the expence of a third person.

The same person concluded his discourse, by saying, that this policy was dictated to us by the HOLY GHOST himself, in the 14th chapter, 34th verse of the *Proverbs*, as being that *righteousness* which *exalteth a nation*, and that such a politician as he hath described, seem'd perfectly secure from all specious seductions, all imaginary perils, and need to have nothing to fear from false devotees
and

and hypocrites. But he acknowledged however, that a perfect uniformity with one's self, and a constant equality, is really above the reach of man. But since every hour of our life, one may say, demonstrates to us the imperfection and weakness of our judgment, as also the imminent danger to which we are every moment exposed, we ought therefore to arm and fortify our selves against all obstacles, to the end we may not be turned out of the right road, or drawn away by our passions, which almost always gets the better of our reason.

These reflections appear'd to me so judicious and so important, especially in the present conjuncture, that I believed it to be my duty to report them to the state.

In the conversation which I had the same day with M. *Amelot* and the other ministers of this court, it seemed to me that their hope was revived and augmented here, of being able to preserve peace between the republic and *France*. It appeared however, that they spoke to me with less openness and frankness than formerly, either on account of the present and uncertain state of affairs, or that they were very careful of dropping any thing that might be ill interpreted by the republic; or in fine, that they might not run any risk of making me displease their high mightinesses by my reports.

I perceived however clearly, that they have still a great regard for the friendship of the republic, as hitherto indeed they have always had, and that the desire of this court for the re-establishment of the public tranquillity of *Europe*, is not less sincere than they have proved it to have been for upwards of eight months, as well by their actions as by the confession of the queen of *Hungary* herself.

So that from all this it appears, that the change in the pacific dispositions in this court, of which I was afraid, for the reasons alleged in my most submissive letter of the 18th instant, at the period beginning, *the before mentioned prince de Grimbergen* is hitherto groundless, as are those of which I informed the state, in my most humble dispatch of the 1st instant, at the period which begins, *In that conversation it moreover appeared to me.* Besides, I am persuaded more and more of the truth of that single reason why *France* does not make propositions herself for the establishing the peace between the emperor and the queen of *Hungary*, on the foot of the *uti possidetis*; which reason is deduced in mine of the 31st of *December* last, at the period which begins, 1. *That this court has given it clearly enough to be understood.*

One of the ministers of this court spoke to me of the equilibrium of *Europe*, in terms much the same with those I have before re-

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ported,

ported, adding thereto, that in his opinion, it was a strong proof of the misery of human nature, that from the commencement of this century we had begun again to abuse the name of a thing which ought never to be mentioned, but with a view to secure the general tranquility of *Europe*, whereas it has never been taken in people's mouths, but to excite or to continue the most terrible war, to the desolating so many countries and states, and to the mutual destruction of the forces of the powers at war, as for several ages before, the sacred name of religion had served the same ends, though really, and in effect, it dictates nothing but charity and friendship, from whence ought to proceed peace itself.

It is said, that the troops of the king's household have orders to hold themselves in readiness to march by the 15th of next month, and there is no body any longer doubts, that the *Austrian Low Countries* will become the stage of a dismal tragedy, if the war should grow general.

The regency of the country of *Valais* have refused the infant don *Philip* a passage through their territories into *Italy*. This refusal was carried only by two voices, and the *Swiss* their confederates have assembled a body of 8000 men to support that government, and to bar the passage of the infant through

through their mountains, which they imagine he will attempt by force.

The ambassador of *Spain* has received advice, that general *de Gages* had passed the *Panaro* the 22d of this month; however as yet I know nothing of the circumstances because I have not been able to get to the speech of the ambassador. For I find his friendship toward me is very much chilled apparently, because my pacific disposition is quite opposite to that of his court.

It is reported that the count *de Saxe* is is charged with some important commission on the part of M. *Broglia*. It is to demonstrate by word of mouth to the King, the necessity of recalling his troops out of *Bavaria*, a thing that marshal has long laboured in writing, but to no purpose. It is certain the count hath already had two audiences of his majesty.

The king gives himself up more and more to business, insomuch that he now confers every day many hours with his ministers and generals, by which his majesty gains more and more the hearts of his people, as well as by his gracious behaviour.

His majesty yesterday declared a numerous promotion of general officers, viz. 14 lieutenants general, and 72 brigadiers.

Marshal *Bellisle*, who it is supposed is already arrived at *Metz*, will there re-

ceive, by a courier, the king's order, to defer his journey to *Paris*. I am

Paris, Feb.
22, 1743.

Yours, &c.

M. *Van Hoey* to M. *Fagel*.

S I R,

THE minister of *Geneva* to this court had delivered me the letter annexed, which, the regency of that city, wrote me, in order to testify their gratitude, for the good offices I endeavoured to do them in the present circumstances of things, by their high mightinesses orders.

I have written an answer to that letter, in terms convenient and conformable to the interest the state takes, in whatever relates to that republic.

The report prevails afresh, and is even stronger than ever, that a negotiation is begun between the courts of *Madrid* and *Turin*, but I see however no greater reason to believe it at present than I did heretofore. The reasons which then rendered it probable are the same that I communicated to the states, in my letter of the 14th and 17th of *January* last, at the period which begins *I am informed that there is no room to doubt that the court of Turin, &c.* which reasons
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of aggravation, for the court of *Turin* subsist still, at least as it is generally said, without the application of any remedy. Add to this, Sir, the reasons comprized in my dispatch of the 21st of last month, at this period, *This furnishes us with a new reason*: for the design of the court of *England* to raise 12,000 *Swiss*, to assist the king of *Sardinia*, is not considered as a remedy either quick enough or sufficient, in regard to the following reasons :

1st, Because the numerous levies that are made on all sides in *Switzerland* in the present conjuncture, have so drained the country, that it requires a great deal of time to enroll 12,000 men ; 2^{dly}, Because the choice both of officers and soldiers are already enrolled, so that the rest are not likely to come up to that notion that is generally formed of the bravery of the troops of that nation ; 3^{dly} and lastly, Because the king of *Sardinia* knows by experience the great desertion to which these troops are liable when they are thus drawn together without choice.

As I have before painted for the state in some of my preceeding letters with as much exactness as I could possibly use the character of the king and of his ministers, I will only add at present, that the count *de Maurepais*, so famous for his great knowledge and long experience in the marine, which are his department,

portment, is also perfectly versed in the law of nations, and in the mathematics. . That minister has a sound judgment, and loves business much. M. *Amelot*, who has possessed for more than six years the office of secretary of state in the department of foreign affairs, has acquired thereby a great knowledge of the interest of princes, the characters of nations, and their manner of thinking. His excellency is particularly well versed in ancient and modern history, and has besides adorned his mind by a very intimate acquaintance with the *Belles Lettres*, for which he has an exquisite taste.

M. *d'Argenson* is also a person of very great knowledge in different branches of learning; he has a very clear judgment, and, as he applies himself assiduously, there is no doubt that in a very little while he will distinguish himself as much in his office of secretary of state, in the department of affairs relating to war, as he has always hitherto done in the different and great employments that he has already filled.

All the ministers of this court seem to me to have the same sentiments on the subject of the true interest that *France* has in the preservation and prosperity of the republic, as also in maintaining and increasing their mutual friendship, which the late cardinal al-

ways

ways had, and which he constantly demonstrated himself to have by all his actions.

I ought to add here what follows, as well to demonstrate the magnanimity of these ministers, as their perfect knowledge of my integrity. It is that notwithstanding it is very likely, that the seducing temptation of war has operated upon them pretty strongly I have never however been able to remark, that when I have discovered sentiments entirely opposite to theirs, this has encreas'd in them any coldness, or at all alter'd the esteem and affection which they have always had for me.

I have this moment received the letter annexed from the *Sieur Brouwer*, consul at *Leghorn*, dated 11th instant, by which their high mightinesses will perceive, that the passage of the *Panaro*, under the general count *de Gages* has had consequences very disadvantageous to the affairs of the queen of *Hungary* in *Italy*. This makes me recollect the fable of the dogs, inserted in my most respectful letter of the 28th of last *January*, at the period which begins, and finally that so long as the court of *Vienna*, &c. and I wish with all my heart, that the truth shadow'd in that fable, may not be again verified, in these times, as it has so often been heretofore.

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It is said, that the infant don *Philip*, is putting himself on his side, into a condition of attempting the passage by the mountains, in order to fall into the *Milaneſe*, but this is look'd upon as impracticable.

I had written thus far, when I received the resolution of their high mightineſſes, of the 15th instant, by which they think proper, for reasons mentioned in the said resolution, that I should be advertised, not to add for the future my particular sentiments, or my advices on the relations which I shall send. I will conform myself to this with all obedience. I demand only most humble permission, to put their high mightineſſes in the most submissive manner in mind, that I have the honour of a seat in their illustrious assembly, as a member of it, and a deputy (*mede geeomteierde*) of their noble and high mightineſſes, our lords the states general of *Holland*, and that my relations have had never any other end, than to communicate to their high mightineſſes, all that could come to my knowledge, and that I believed could any ways concern the interest of the state directly or indirectly ; I do not recollect that I have added to my relation, any particular sentiment except only with respect to consequences, which as I conceived would naturally and necessarily result from things, regard

gard being had to the dispositions of minds in this court; and to the nature of its affair. It is also true; that from the beginning of my embassy to this moment, I have always wished from my heart and soul; that my sincere and faithful relations might serve to banish and drive away all sinister interpretations and distrusts, and be the blessed means by which the grace of the almighty, should fix, secure and augment the mutual friendship between this court and the republic, and be also assisting in maintaining and securing that peace, which is so precious for the state.

However, I afflict myself the more if it be possible, to think (and I say it with great humility) that I should hence run the least danger that these constant wishes, however warm and zealous they may be, should one day prove fatal to me, and be taken in ill part: for I have always believed that these very things, for the accomplishment of which these relations and reflections were to serve, were among the principal causes of my embassy to this court, as also very conformable to the orders of their high mightinesses.

I shall look upon myself notwithstanding as infinitely unhappy to have given occasion for these complaints, with the best intention in the world; and tho' labouring with

all the assiduity and fidelity that it was possible, to have displeased their high mightinesses, either thro' want of judgment, or thro' deficiency in knowledge, or otherwise. I shall not however cease to place my confidence in the great wisdom of their high mightinesses, and in their justice, always equally perfect, because the clearness of my conscience re-assures me and persuades me, that I shall never provoke their indignation, for the reasons pronounced by the Holy Spirit himself, *Prov. xvii. 26.* and also because my obedience shall be always perfect and without any exception.

There was also sent me at the same time I received the before-mentioned resolution of their high mightinesses, the extract added hereto of a letter from *Milan*, addressed to a person of distinction of the same city, called the marquis d'*Alorio*, which letter is apparently fabricated at *Paris*.

I am told that the letters from *Basil* of the 17th instant say, that those that arrived from the *Austrian* army, and were dated on the 8th, confirm not only the news of the advantage which the *Austrian* and *Piedmontese* troops had obtained two days before over the *Spaniards*, but they likewise add, that the battle was fought between *Solaro* and *Campo Santo*, and that the victors were then in pursuit of the vanquished.

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It is said at present, that the orders that were sent some days ago to the marshal *Belisle*, to hinder his journey hither, were for no other reason than that he might remain a little longer at *Francfort*, where his presence was necessary for the service of his court.

The dauphin found himself a little indisposed the day before yesterday, and it is remarked that the violent cold which has for some time reigned in *Italy*, begins to be felt here.

Paris, Feb.
25, 1743.

I am, Sir, &c.

F I N I S.



1857

It is said at present, that the orders that
were sent some days ago to the marshal
Baker, to hinder his journey further, were
for no other reason than that he might re-
main a little longer at New York, where his
presence was necessary for the service of his
court.

The dancing found himself a little indis-
posed the day before yesterday, and it is re-
marked that the violent cold which has for
some time reigned in the city, begins to be felt
here.



1 am, 2m, 3m

1 am, 2m, 3m

1857



